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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis focuses on the perceptions of the Turkish Republican elites 
towards Arabs between 1930 and 1940. Although relations with the Arab 
world have attracted the interest of scholars starting with the 1980s, the 
literature is quite weak regarding the early Republican period. In an attempt 
to fill this gap, this thesis looks at the Ulus, semi-official newspaper of the 
ruling Republican People’s Party at the time, to reveal both diplomatic and 
cultural relations between Turks and Arabs. There are three main findings of 
the thesis. First, as reflected by the Ulus, Turkey did not neglect the 
diplomatic relations as it is mostly argued. Second, peaceful relations in the 
diplomatic arena did not translate into cultural or identity level feelings 
towards the Arabs. Arabic identity was instrumentalized in order to reinforce 
the modern, secular and Western Turkish identity that the Republican elites 
wanted to create. Third, Republican elites made use of domestic affairs, 
successes and failures, of the Arab countries in advantage of the Kemalist 
regime of Turkey. Failures of the Arab countries suggested the relative 
success of the Kemalist regime, which was modern, secular and Western 
oriented. In case of successes of the Arab countries, Turkey was shown as the 
role model for these Arab countries. This thesis is important in the sense that 
it brings more nuanced analysis of the relations at the time and reveals the 
perceptions of the Republican elites towards Arabs through the stereotypes 
they used.  
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ÖZET 
 
Bu tez Cumhuriyetçi elitlerin 1930-1940 yılları arasındaki Arap algısını konu 
alıyor. 1980’den sonra Arap dünyasıyla ilişkiler konusu akademisyenlerin 
ilgisini çekmiş olsa da, erken Cumhuriyet dönemi özelinde literatür oldukça 
zayıftır. Bu boşluğu doldurmak amacıyla, bu tez dönemin Cumhuriyet Halk 
Partisi’nin yarı resmi gazetesi olarak bilinen Ulus Gazetesi’ne, Türkler ve 
Araplar arasındaki hem diplomatik hem de kültürel ilişkileri açığa çıkarmak 
için odaklanıyor. Tezin üç temel bulgusu vardır. Birincisi, Ulus 
Gazetesi’nden yola çıkarak, Türkiye çoğunlukla iddia edildiği gibi Arap 
ülkeleriyle diplomatik ve siyasi ilişkilerini göz ardı etmemiştir. İkincisi, 
diplomatik ve siyasi seviyedeki dostane ilişkiler, kültürel ve kimliksel 
düzeyde Araplara yönelik yakınlık hissine dönüşmemiştir. Arap kimliği ve 
ilintili kategoriler, Cumhuriyetçi elitlerin oluşturmaya çalıştığı modern, 
seküler ve Batılı bir Türk kimliğini pekiştirmek için araçsallaştırılmıştır. Son 
olarak, Arap ülkelerinin iç siyaseti, başarıları ve başarısızlıkları Cumhuriyetçi 
elitler tarafından Türkiye’deki Kemalist rejimin avantajına kullanılmıştır. Bu 
ülkelerin başarısızlıkları, Kemalist rejimin batılı, seküler ve modern yapısı 
gösterilerek Türkiye’nin farkı vurgulanmış; başarıları karşısında da Türkiye 
bu ülkeler için rol model olarak sunulmuştur. Bu tez, bahsi geçen dönemdeki 
ilişkilerin daha incelikli analizini yapması ve Cumhuriyetçi elitin Araplara 
yönelik algılarını kullanılan stereotipler üzerinden ortaya çıkarması 
dolayısıyla önemlidir. Bu algılar da hem iki tarafın ilişkilerini hem de 
Türkiye’de Arap kimliğini bir şekilde hedef almış reformları anlamak adına 
oldukça mühimdir. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
Main purpose of this study is to shed light on the perceptions of the Turkish 
Republican elite toward Arabs in the early Republican era. Although relations 
with the Arab world starting with the 1980’s has been of interest to scholars 
of history and political science, early Republican period did not receive the 
same degree of interest. This period has mostly been neglected due to a 
perception that relations with the Arab world at the time were not a primary 
concern for the Turkish Republic. As the Republic neglected the relations, 
according to the perception, so did the literature. 
 
An archival research for Prof. Cemil Kocak, as part of my research 
assistantship, initiated my interest in this particular subject. Although that 
research had nothing to do with my current interest, as I encountered with the 
reports regarding the Arab countries in several newspapers, some of them 
being positive and some of them not, I started to reconsider my previous 
perception that newly founded Republic broke the ties with the Arab world 
and the Middle East. Besides, as I went through the years, I also observed 
significant amount of negative perceptions against Arabs. I realized that the 
stereotypes that we used today were actually being employed in similar ways 
around 80 years ago. Then I started to ask, “Did the Turkish Republic really 
severe its political and diplomatic ties with the Arab world?” as it is widely 
believed so. If it did not, what would then explain the contradictory attitudes 
toward Arabs? Why the Republican elites both tried to maintain the peaceful 
relations with Arabs and employ derogatory terms against them?  
 
Although one may argue that strong ties exist between the two peoples with 
regard to Islamic connotations and common Ottoman past, we still witness 
negative stereotypes against Arabs being used in the everyday life.  The 
  2 
everyday language still employs same old phrases that contain racist tones in 
it. There are numerous Internet forums that are devoted to so-called betrayal 
of Arabs to the Turks, which are followed by racist comments in almost all 
instances.
1
 Such language is not limited to the Internet; it is also possible to 
find popular books that portray Arabs as traitors.
2
 It is therefore useful to look 
at such history of stereotypes against Arabs to better understand the historical 
connections between the two usages and the damage it caused since then. In 
most occasions, Arabs are perceived as those who backstabbed the Ottomans 
during the World War I. I personally can easily recall stereotypes, some of 
them also being possibly familiar to the reader, being used in the popular 
language against Arabs including Arabs being filthy, greedy, undeveloped, 
uncivilized and those who live in the deserts. We see that such stereotypes 
have a long history and can be traced back to the early Republican period, 
and probably they go back even further to the Ottoman period if they were to 
be traced, possibly in a future research.  
 
Republican elites had a hard task, which was maintaining the peaceful 
relations with the Arab world in the diplomatic and foreign policy level, and 
to construct a new Turkish identity and build a new nation out of the ashes of 
the Ottoman Empire through exploiting Arabs, their associated culture and 
civilization. This hard task required a nuanced diplomacy; denigration of the 
Arab culture and identity as opposed to that of Turkish, must not have 
endangered the peaceful relations and cause hostility between Turkey and the 
Arab world in the state level. As a reflection of the foreign policy principle of 
Turkey at the time that stipulated to maintain peaceful relations with 
everyone and not engage any unnecessary conflict, Republican policy makers 
made sure that Arab countries were not exceptions.  
                                                          
1
  “Çağlar Boyu Arap İhanetleri”. Tarih Türklerde Başlar. November 20, 2011. 
Retrieved from http://tarihturklerdebaslar.wordpress.com/2011/11/20/caglar-
boyu-arap-ihanetleri/; “Arapların Türklere Yaptığı Katliamlar ve İhanetler”. 
Memurlar.net. October 18, 2011. Retrieved from 
http://forum.memurlar.net/konu/1395824/  
 
2
  For one of the most blunt examples of such narrative with several racist 
claims see, Arsel, İlhan. Arap Milliyetçiliği ve Türkler. İstanbul: Kaynak 
Yayınları, 2011 
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This thesis has three main points. First, as opposed to the main belief, Turkish 
Republic did not severe its ties and cut off diplomatic relations with the Arab 
world following its foundation. This simplistic approach fails to fully grasp 
complex relations at the time and do not give any insight. Although I do not 
argue that the Middle East did not rank on top of the foreign policy priorities 
of Turkey, relations with the Arab world did not differ that much from that of 
Western world in terms of diplomatic relations. Yes, Turkey wanted to be a 
part of the Western world, and the Arab world was not the region that Turkey 
wanted to be a part of. However, this never resulted in cutting off the political 
or diplomatic relations. Moreover, considering Turkey’s general inward 
looking policy priority due to its domestic problems aroused from being a 
newly established state, relations with the Arab world were quite normal as 
reflected by the Ulus. 
 
Second, friendly relations in the state level did not translate into identity level 
close feelings. Arabic identity and any associated terms with it were 
disregarded, insulted and humiliated when necessary, by the Republican 
elites. Arabic identity represented the antonym of the Turkish identity in the 
eyes of the Republicans. The modernist elite tried hard to remove any Arabic 
influence on Turkish culture.
3
 Therefore, it was functional for them to use 
stereotypes against Arabs to reinforce the newly created Turkish identity. To 
put in another way, Turkish identity was defined in terms of not being an 
Arab. The tendency to define Turkishness through what it is not can also be 
observed in the Young Turk period.
4
 Moreover, by using stereotypes against 
Arabs, Republican elites tried to legitimize some of the state policies 
including script change, Turkish language purification process, ban on 
traditional Turkish music and ban on wearing of fez through associating these 
with the Arabs. Since all these policies were somehow related to the Arabs 
                                                          
3
  Vali, A. Ferenc. Bridge Across the Bosporus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971, p. 273 
 
4
  Üngör, Uğur Ümit. The Making of Modern Turkey: Nation and State in 
Eastern Anatolia 1913-1950. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 
52 
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and their assumed identity, by using pejorative terms against Arabs and 
associating scripts, wearing of fez or traditional Turkish music with them, I 
argue that elites expected to gain at least an implicit support or obedience to 
these controversial policies. 
 
Third, Republican elites made use of successes or failures of the Arabic 
countries in every possible opportunity. They used their success as to show 
how they imitated Turkey in such successes or how Turkish reforms under 
the Kemalist regime could be a model for the Arabic countries. Their failures 
were also exploited to prove again the success of the Turkish regime and to 
legitimize controversial policies that created turbulence in the society. 
Through Arabic countries’ problems, Republican elites could differentiate 
themselves and prove the necessity of the controversial policies in the 
Turkish model.  
 
This thesis assumes that Republican elites were the only ones who were 
capable of agenda setting and policy making in the time period that I am 
interested in. One of the main theses of the groundbreaking book of Tunçay 
argues that with the enactment of “Law on Maintenance of Order” [Takrir-i 
Sükun] in 1925, single party period in Turkey had started.5 After that moment 
state, bureaucracy and the party – Republican People’s Party- intertwined. 
Checks and balances did not exist to control the power of the ruling elites. 
Therefore, foreign policy was in the hands of few ruling figures.
6
 As a result, 
Republican elites and the Turkish state were used interchangeably throughout 
the thesis. 
 
Another aim of this thesis is to provide first hand information from the Ulus 
that is considered to be semi-official gazette of the Republican elites. It, 
therefore, does not highly engage on secondary sources and does not heavily 
                                                          
 
5
  Tunçay, Mete. Türkiye’de Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması 1923-1931, 
İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2012 
 
6
  Barlas, Dilek. Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey. Leiden: Brill, 1998, p. 111 
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summarize the past literature –which is, as already noted, quite scarce. In the 
limits of a master’s thesis, it seeks to make an original contribution to the 
literature. Although one may argue that as a result of the selection bias, one 
cannot make generalizations from the data retrieved from a single newspaper, 
it is important to note that the daily Ulus can give a fair idea of what 
Republican elite wanted to do. More importantly, since the common belief 
tends to disregard the relations with the Arab world in the Kemalist period 
because of their ideology, a Kemalist newspaper that proves almost the 
opposite is significant enough to reconsider our past beliefs. 
 
I would like to inform the readers that these main results are within the 
boundary of the data received mainly from the Ulus. I am only interested in 
the excerpts from both the Ulus and for the last chapter only, the Akbaba. 
Therefore we can only say that the main findings of this thesis are how the 
Ulus and the Akbaba reflected the issues in the time period that is under 
consideration. Again, since my main motivation is to reveal how Republican 
elites perceived Arabs, the data is sufficient to make such conclusions. 
  
 
 
1.1. Source and Case Selection 
 
 
This thesis heavily built upon reports from the daily Ulus –until November 
28, 1934 the Hakimiyet-i Milliye. The Ulus is considered to be the semi-
official newspaper of the Republican People’s Party (RPP).7 Therefore we 
assume that it reflects the views of the Republican elites. MP’s from RPP 
occasionally wrote op-eds for this newspaper and found the chance to inform 
the readers about the policies of their party. Archival research was needed to 
reach the necessary issues. Although large portions of the issues between the 
years of 1930 and 1940 were available, some issues were missing or simply 
under maintenance and were not allowed for researcher to reach.  
 
                                                          
7
  Gürkan, Nilgün. Türkiye'de Demokrasiye Geçişte Basın (1945-1950). 
İstanbul: İletişim Yay, 1998, p. 49; Konyar, Hürriyet. Ulus Gazetesi, CHP ve 
Kemalist İlkeler. İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1999 
  6 
In addition to the daily Ulus, popular humor magazine the Akbaba was also 
used to reveal the popular perception towards Arab. The Ulus alone would 
fall short to reflect the general perception. A humor magazine, on the other 
hand, can help us to see if such perceptions had a reflection in the popular 
culture. Moreover, humor magazines do not necessarily worry about the same 
issues, as an ordinary newspaper would do. As one may imagine, for instance, 
caricature magazines may feel much more comfortable while covering a 
controversial issue and therefore reveal its views with lesser hesitation. With 
such functionality, I included Akbaba for my archival research covering the 
same time period.  
 
For the second chapter, Syria, Egypt and Palestine Question were chosen as 
cases for both practical and academic reasons. First, since most of the data 
was related to diplomatic relations, including all Arabic countries would 
result in unbalance between the chapters. Instead, I chose Syria as one case 
due to the volume of news that the Ulus reported and to see the attitude of the 
elites in times of crisis between the two country arising from the Hatay 
Question. Second, I included Egypt because I think that the relations between 
the two countries in the early Republican period needed more attention since 
there is a niche on such topic. And lastly, I included Palestine Question as a 
thematic case to see how the Republicans covered the question. Palestine 
Question is one of the defining issues for the Arab identity, since Arabs in 
general perceives themselves as the victims and internalizes the question. For 
instance according to Al Dakuki it is hard to “visualize a general framework 
of the image Turkish public opinion has of the Arabs, positive or negative, 
without considering the Palestinian conflict or the common vision towards 
Islam and consequently towards Arabs”.8 
 
For this chapter one should bear in mind that there are significant amounts of 
reports about the domestic issues of the selected countries. Therefore, this 
chapter does not only deal with the bilateral relations but also internal politics 
                                                          
8
  Al Dakuki, Ibrahim. “Arab and Turkish Images of Each Other” in Labib, 
Tahar (ed.). Imagining the Arab Other: How Arabs and Non-Arabs View 
Each Other. New York: I. B. Tauris, 2008, p. 284 
  7 
of these countries. It is important to analyze how their internal problems were 
portrayed in the Ulus and how the columnists exploited them in advantage of 
the Turkish regime. 
 
With all these in mind, Chapter 2 deals with the Turkey’s relations with Syria 
and Egypt and also it deals with how the Palestine Question was portrayed by 
the Ulus. It shows how in the diplomatic level Turkey tried to avoid conflicts 
and maintained peaceful relations with these countries whenever possible. It 
also shows that, as opposed to the common belief, Turkey had a significant 
diplomatic relations with the Arab world. It also shows how reports from the 
Ulus that are not related to bilateral relations were exploited by the 
Republican elites. Chapter 3 covers the language purification process of 
Turkish and its relation with the Arabic identity. It demonstrates how Arabic 
rooted words were treated as part of a general Arabic identity and therefore 
thrown away from the language. Chapter 4 focuses on the stereotypes against 
Arabs that were used both in Daily Ulus and Akbaba. It also combines 
stereotype literature in psychology with history to give meaning to the 
stereotyping process and the motivation behind it. It shows how stereotypes 
were functional for the elites in creating a new Turkish identity. 
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2. TURKEY’S RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD: CASES OF 
SYRIA, EGYPT AND THE PALESTINE QUESTION 
 
 
 
  
Scholars have mostly neglected Turkish foreign policy towards the Arab 
world. With the belief in mind that Turkey did not have enough diplomatic 
relations with the Arabic countries, scholars mostly tended to superficially 
talk about some agreements between Turkey and Arab countries and give a 
narrative of thematic questions, such as Hatay Question. For instance Aydın 
argues that Turkey isolated itself from the Middle East.
9
 Similarly, Hale 
asserts that Turkey turned its back to the Muslim world as an objective to 
raise Turkey to the level of modern civilization.
10
 
It is not only the relations with the Arabs that were neglected by the scholars 
in the early Republican period, but also a comprehensive analysis of Turkish 
foreign policy in general. Barlas rightfully argues that literature is almost 
nonexistent on the Turkish foreign policy in the 1930s.
11
 She connects 
domestic developments and Turkish foreign policy instead of offering 
singular international systemic explanations. Besides, she does not only 
survey the events that took place, she explains why it did so in a well-written 
theoretical background. Although she provides strong theoretical explanations 
for the Turkish foreign policy at the time, her book too, falls short to cover 
the relations with the Arab world.  
 
Important reference books on Turkish foreign policy also do not elaborate 
enough on Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East in general and the 
                                                          
9
  Aydın, Mustafa, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical 
Framework and Traditional Inputs”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 35, No. 4, 
1939, p.153  
 
10
  Hale, William, Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774, New York: Routledge, p. 
42 
 
11
  Barlas, Dilek. p. XIII 
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Arab world in particular.
12
 Since they cover a large time period it is hard to 
find detailed accounts of the relations with the Arab world. They are by no 
means, however, insignificant; on the contrary they provide valuable 
information on Turkish foreign policy in general. They only lack the issue 
that I am interested in this thesis. 
 
Although there is one significant reference book that takes both sides’ views 
on relations between the Arabs and Turks, it covers a huge time period and 
therefore it falls short to pay enough attention on what I cover throughout this 
thesis.
13
 This book, written by several Arabic and Turkish scholars, deals with 
the relations between the two peoples starting from the early modern times to 
the moment. It is a significant reference book for it reveals the positions of 
both Arabic and Turkish scholars on the relations in general terms. Duran and 
Karaca also explore the relations with the Arab world during the single party 
period. They argue that as a result of the positivist, secular and progressive 
ideology of the ruling elites, Turkey employed an orientalist language, which 
was borrowed from the West, towards the East. Moreover, they argue that 
Turkey had no special interest for the Arab world.
14
 Their article, however, 
do not offer any original information or explanation for the complicated 
relations at the time. 
 
Hasan Kayalı’s book is one of the most brilliant books that have ever been 
written on the relations. However, it covers the period from Tanzimat to the 
end of the Ottoman Empire, thus does not fill the gap.
15
 His book offers 
                                                          
12
  Gönlübol, Mehmet (ed.). Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, Ankara: Siyasal 
Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1974; Oran, Baskın (ed.), Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş 
Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar (Cilt 1, 1919-1980),  
İstanbul: İletişim Yay., 2005 
13
  IRCICA, İki Tarafın Bakış Açısından Türk Arap Münasebetleri, Istanbul: 
İslam, Tarih, Sanat ve Kültür Araştırma Merkezi, 2000   
 
14
  Duran, Hasan and Karaca, Ahmet. “Tek Parti Dönemi Türk-Arap İlişkileri”. 
Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi. 
Vol. 16, No. 3, 2011, pp. 203-216 
 
15
  Kayalı, Hasan. Arabs and Young Turks : Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism 
in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
  10 
excellent analysis of the Young Turk policies towards the Arabs. It 
contributes to our historical understanding of the relations between the two. 
Since the founders of the Turkish Republic were also Ottoman officials, it 
gives valuable insight on the raison d'être of the elites. He challenges the 
widely known narrative that the Turkification policies of the Young Turk 
resulted in the Arab nationalism. He argues that those policies actually aimed 
to maintain integrity within the Ottoman Empire and Turkification was the 
result of the Arab nationalism. 
 
Similarly, Kurşun, a prominent scholar of Ottoman history with a special 
emphasis on the Arab world, examines the relations starting with the Arab 
nationalism and analyzes the policies of Sultan Abdulhamid, which he argues 
mitigated the negative effects of the Arab nationalism.
16
 His book too, 
however, does not cover the Kemalist period.
17
  
 
In this chapter, keeping all these shortcomings in mind, relations with Syria 
and Egypt will be explored in detail based on the reports taken from the Ulus. 
And lastly, Palestine Question and the way it was portrayed will also be 
analyzed.  
 
 
 
 
2.1. Relations with Syria 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
1997 
 
16
  Kurşun, Zekeriya. Yol Ayrımında Türk Arap İlişkileri. İstanbul: İrfan 
Yayınevi, 1992 
 
17
  There are several other books that do not cover the period that I am covering 
here. However they are important to have a sense of historical background of 
the relations. These examples include, Kutay, Cemal. Tarihte Türkler ve 
Araplar –Hilafet Meselesi. İstanbul: Aksoy Yayıncılık, 2000; for an account 
of the relations between Turks and Arabs from an interesting Turkish Muslim 
intellectual figüre see, Halid, Çerkeşşeyhizade Halil. Türk ve Arap. İstanbul: 
Yeni Zamanlar Yayınları, 2006; for the Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Arab world after WWII see, Kürkçüoğlu, Ömer. Türkiye'nin Arap 
Ortadoğu'suna Karşı Politikası (1945 – 1970). İstanbul: Barış Kitap, 2011 
 
  11 
 
Turkey's relations with Syria were strictly connected to relations with France, 
since the latter was the mandatory state over Syria. That's why I will focus on 
agreements, negotiations and any other form of relations between Turkey and 
Syria through France, time to time. It does not mean, however, that Turkey 
had no relations with the Syrian government or Syrian people whatsoever. 
Indeed, Turkey tried not to break her ties with them and emphasized Turkey's 
friendship with Syria in every occasion. As we will see, Turkey will have to 
carry on the relations through France after Syrian government choice not to 
ratify the agreement that gave Hatay a certain degree of independence.  
 
Reports concerning Syria had been overwhelmingly about the border issues 
between Turkey and France in the 1930s. For instance, a protocol between the 
two countries signed on June 29, 1929 was published in the Hakimiyet-i 
Milliye on April 16, 1930.
18
 It was about the future of the people who lived in 
the disputed territories, because their situation was uncertain since the dispute 
over the borderline had not been resolved at the time. The agreement 
provided legal basis for people to choose their citizenship and protect their 
immovables. It did not, however, put forward any resolution regarding the 
borderline. 
 
It was not only the border dispute that the Hakimiyet-i Milliye cared about, 
but also the political developments in general in Syria. For instance, the 
newspaper closely followed the general elections, which was held in the late 
1931 and created significant upheavals that resulted in number of casualties.
19
 
In addition to that, when the rumors about Abbas Hilmi Pasha to be the next 
King of Syria was unleashed, the Hakimiyet-i Milliye informed their readers 
that Abbas Hilmi Pasha had no such an intention and that according to him 
the regime had to be a democratic republic, after a phone interview with 
                                                          
18
 Hakimiyet-i Milliye, April 16, 1930 
19
 Hakimiyet-i Milliye, December 22, 28, 1931; January 7, 20, 1932, April 6, 
1932 
  12 
him.
20
  
 
In 1933, we observe a considerable decline of reporting on Syria. Among the 
significant ones were the ratification process of the protocol that had been 
signed by France and Turkey in the parliament; and the first meeting of the 
Syrian border commission composed of Turkish and French representatives.
21
 
We should note that the decline continues in the following year.  
 
Starting with 1935 we witness a significant quantitative increase of coverings 
on Syria. These reports, however, do not contain vital political developments 
in the country but only daily briefs. This increase can be explained with the 
editorial change in the Hakimiyet-i Milliye -from now on Ulus- that started to 
give daily news from the neighboring countries under the series of “What is 
happening in our neighborhood?” These views are very neutral in nature, 
since they do not contain any controversial issues.  
 
In one op-eds about Syrian affairs, N. A. Küçüka shows his solidarity with 
Syria and address the nationalist protests against French mandatory body, 
with a reference to the common Ottoman past and because such common past 
one should not remain indifferent to the events regarding Arabs. He clearly 
says that he would welcome a free Syrian state but with a reservation on 
Sancak region since it contains people “who are different from the rest of the 
Syrian people considering their feelings and who have deep cultural 
differences”.22 Although friendly messages towards the Arab countries in a 
diplomatic manner is common in the Ulus, a reflection of the cautious foreign 
policy of the early Republican era, a somehow positive reference to the 
Ottoman past is quite hard to observe in this period.  
 
In his second op-ed, Küçüka continues his support for Syria for its 
independence from the French mandatory government. He refers to Syrian 
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people as “our friends”, which is also commonly used for any neighboring 
countries in a diplomatic language. He again notes that because of the cultural 
differences, Turks living in Hatay should be given autonomy.
23
 This cautious 
and pragmatic language is in a perfect harmony with the Turkey's foreign 
policy principles in that period.
24
 
 
These concerns regarding the status of Hatay derive from an agreement 
reached between France and Syria in September 9, 1936 that stipulated 
freedom of Syria within 3 years leaving all rights of the French mandatory 
government over Syrian territories to the Syrian state and had no reference to 
Hatay.
25
 There was a fear that Hatay's status would be considered and 
diminished to a minority position [ekalliyet] and this was not acceptable for 
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the Ulus and obviously for the Turkish government, as well.
26
 As a result, 
Turkey sent a diplomatic note to France explaining Turkey's demands over 
Hatay in the same day. Concerns over the status of Hatay, did not end with 
the explanation
27
 provided by the head of the commission that signed the 
treaty; on the contrary, the editor-in-chief of the Ulus declared his 
disappointment with the brief. According to Atay, the treaty was more than 
welcome for the Turkish Kemalists that would give Syrians their 
independence as a result of their nationalist struggle; but with the same logic 
Hatay had needed autonomy. According to him, Turks living in Hatay should 
not be considered minority in Syria but majority in Hatay.
28
 In the following 
day, Minister of Foreign Affairs Aras gave a speech at the League of Nations 
addressing the Hatay Question and offered a bilateral meeting with France to 
which France responded that Syria should also be added to the negotiations.
29
 
Aras' words were mentioned in the newspapers and supported by the Ulus.
30
 
 
While clearly showing a disappointment with the status of Hatay, the editorial 
language of the Ulus had always been cautious and far from being hostile 
towards Syria. As noted, it was the result of the Turkey's foreign policy vision 
at the time. With the future developments including clashes in the region, 
however, this language will slowly include a relatively unfriendly tone.  
 
In October 8, the Ulus published the speech made by Aras and the response 
of the French delegate in the League of Nations that recognized the claims of 
Aras about the status of Hatay and promised to protect the rights of the Turks 
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in Hatay who constituted the majority.
31
 In the mid October, the Ulus 
reported the general elections in Syria, which Turks in Hatay refused to 
participate. According to the Ulus there were severe pressures on Turkish 
origin people in the region to participate including use of force, beating and 
even shootings.
32
 It was also noted that the Turks had not been responding to 
the pressures and fomentation by staying peacefully. The Ulus also claimed 
that Syrians had offered Turks money to convince them to participate in 
elections, an attempt that had failed.
33
 Despite the efforts for the contrary, 
according to the Ulus, only 190 participated in elections out of 40.000 voters. 
The newspaper accused the ones who ran for the parliament, for “exposing 
their personality”.34 News on the elections questioning its legitimacy 
continued to appear and the friendly attitude towards Syria turned into a 
skeptical one pointing out Turkey's rights on Hatay. Editor-in-chief suggested 
that friendly relations could only be possible as long as Syria recognized the 
claims of Turkey.
35
 
 
Foreign Minister Aras' speech in the Turkish parliament addressed the Hatay 
question in a very detailed manner. Aras gave the details of the diplomatic 
notes and defended Turkey’s rights on Hatay with an emphasis on such an 
outcome that leaves Hatay to Turkey would strengthen the peaceful relations 
between Turkey and Syria. Interestingly, some of the MPs went beyond the 
peaceful declarations in their speeches and talked about possible use of force. 
For instance Kocaeli MP Hakkı Kılıç said that if the government failed to 
solve the problem with “white paper” Turkish nation was ready to give them 
“red ink” to create a “red paper”, implying a war. Moreover, Ankara MP Aka 
Gündüz made it clear that if it was necessary they were ready to “hunt Hatay 
with guns”.36 
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After the delegate was sent to the League of Nations (LoN) to negotiate the 
Hatay issue with French counterparts, the PM İnönü made a speech in the 
parliament. While emphasizing Turkey's friendship with the Arabs, he also 
responded the claims made by Arabs that they were ill-treated in the Ottoman 
Empire by saying that Arabs were as much responsible as Turks or Albanians 
for their status in the Empire since the Arab officials remained faithful to the 
Sultan.
37
 This speech is significant in the sense that PM İnönü officially 
showed his positive views on Arabs and that there was no problem between 
Turks and Arabs. The editor-in-chief also approved PM's speech and 
highlighted the parts about the warm feelings for the Arabs.
38
  
 
While the negotiations continued in the LoN, columnists in the Ulus firmly 
defended Turkey's demands stressing the rightfulness of the Turkish demands 
and criticizing France's attitude. Burhan Belge went even further declaring 
that the independence of Hatay would not be an “Arabic [he means the 
language] independence but Turkish, that is to say true and full 
independence”.39 These words signals the negative perception of Belge 
towards Arabs, implying that independence that is related to Arabs cannot be 
a full fledged one. In this period, news focusing on the harsh conditions of the 
Turks in Hatay and attacks coming from Arabs were also published 
abundantly.
40
 The Ulus emphasized that attacks were aimed towards those 
who wore hats, signifying the loyalty of the Turks to the Turkish reforms in 
Hatay that differentiates themselves from the fez wearing Arabs.
41
 
 
Following the arrival of a new independent delegate sent by LoN to 
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investigate the Hatay question in the field, turbulent environment had risen 
and lethal clashes had started to take place between the Arabs and Turks. In 
these pieces, Arabs were portrayed as the perpetrators of the clashes.
42
 
Although we see that there were numbers of Arabs who had been severely 
injured or died in the clashes
43
, the Ulus remained reluctant to give details on 
Arab casualties. When it comes to Turkish casualties, however, the Ulus 
chose to use a quite aggressive tone and extensively covered the losses, 
mostly on their front page. 
 
Despite this pessimistic atmosphere
44
, in January 24, 1937 Turkey and France 
finally managed to come to terms on certain issues over Hatay Question. 
According to this agreement, Hatay was to be free in her domestic affairs but 
dependent on Syria in foreign affairs; Hatay would be able to establish its 
own parliament and have her own constitution, and France and Turkey were 
to cooperatively protect Hatay against any foreign attack.
45
  
 
According to Atay, the agreement was a positive step towards realizing 
Turkey's demands; but he emphasized that it had not ended the problem 
completely.
46
 The next day, the LoN accepted Sandler’s report on Hatay, in 
addition to above-mentioned status of Hatay; the report recognized Turkish as 
the official language of Hatay. The Ulus covered it in the following days 
stating that the problems had finally been resolved. It preferred to refer the 
question as “our Hatay cause [dava]”, which showed it was more than an 
ordinary diplomatic dispute.
47
 Atay commented on the issue noting that it was 
a national cause, which ended up in a positive way. He further stated that the 
rights of the Turks had fully granted in Hatay by the new report. According to 
him, new status of Hatay would enhance the peaceful relations between Syria 
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and Turkey.
48
  
 
Turkish PM İnönü in his speech delivered at the parliament, addressed the 
Turkey's success on Hatay question and sent friendly messages to Syria by 
saying that they would welcome independent Syria. According to him, like 
Atay, Hatay's new status would improve the relations.
49
 Both Atay's writings 
and İnönü's speech gives us an idea on how Republican elite did not want any 
confrontations with Syria, which is, again, a reflection of Turkey's foreign 
policy principles.  
 
Another example, which shows Hatay was not simply a foreign affairs issue 
but a national cause; a question that is widely exploited for internal affairs, is 
the “National Hatay Demonstration” organized in the capital city of Ankara 
in January 31. According to the Ulus, thousands were gathered to celebrate 
Hatay's independence.
50
 As we understand from the atmosphere in that 
period, the new agreement on Hatay was being served as independence 
although Hatay remained dependent on Syria in her foreign affairs.  
 
The Ulus' news about the “positive reactions” of the Arabs towards the Hatay 
question can be taken as evidence that Turkey was cautious regarding the 
possible outrage coming from Arabic countries. The Ulus published news that 
showed Iraqi people's pleasure deriving from the peaceful settlement of the 
dispute and also it published a letter sent to the Turkish radio signed by two 
hundred Syrian that showed their love for Turkey and Ataturk.
51
 In the same 
manner, the editor-in-chief Atay wrote that news coming from Iraq, Syria and 
Egypt had showed that people of these countries were satisfied with the 
current situation. He drew attention to the “pointless efforts to create a 
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problem between Arabs and Turks” and wrote that Turks would only be 
happy with the developing conditions of the Arab world.
52
   
 
The Ulus, in order to prove the existence of the positive Arab public opinion 
for Turkey to its readers, reported news blaming the National Bloc 
[Vataniler] in Syria for provoking Arabs. In a period when violence reached 
its peak the Ulus was reporting that Arabs had not trusted the Nationalists.
53
 
Once, the Ulus reported that Nationalists were taking Arabs, who were the 
sympathizers of Turkey, into custody and send them to jails where Turks 
were held. According to a local Arab who was interviewed by the Ulus, “if 
Nationalists were to continue doing this, the whole country would turn into a 
huge prison since all Arabs loved Turks”.54 The Ulus tried to create a 
perception, according to which Arabs generally supported Turkish cause and 
recognized Turkey's rights over Hatay. Situation in Syria, however, was far 
from being this positive. 
 
Although the Ulus and its columnists commented on the report in positive 
terms and pointed out its favorable outcomes for the Turkish-Syrian relations, 
Syrian government and nationalist front seemed to disagree with the Ulus’s 
perception on Sandler's report. There had been significant numbers of assaults 
reported by the Ulus coming from the local forces especially in Hatay 
region.
55
  
 
What we understand from the language that the Ulus used when reporting the 
incidents is that it tried not to blame Arabs in general but put the blame on 
local authorities. It also mostly noted that Arabs were provoked both by the 
local authorities and some French mandate officers.
56
 My explanation for this 
attitude would be that the Ulus wanted to prove its readers that Turkey's 
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demands over Hatay were rightful and that the Arab public opinion was also 
supportive of the Turkish government, which denotes the Turkish 
government's successful foreign policy.  
 
In May 29, committee for the status of Hatay finished their work and they 
approved the new status and it planned to be come into force with a new 
constitution by October 29, 1937. According to the draft, the official language 
of Hatay was to be Turkish. Arabic language would be the second official 
language of Hatay.
57
 According to the Ulus Syrian PM also declared his 
contentedness for the outcome along with the Turkish officials
58
. 
 
Similar to the previous incidences, after the declaration of the new status of 
Hatay, people in Syria did not remain calm as the Ulus tried to portray. 
Although it was the Ulus itself who made the claims that Arabs were 
supportive of the Turks and that the new status of Hatay was welcomed; 
again the Ulus continued to report several news that proved the opposite. 
Especially, the National Block's members, according to the Ulus, started 
violent incidences throughout the country but mostly centered in Hatay. Also 
large gang groups attacked to Turks and Hatay People's Party.
59
 In the 
following days the situation in Hatay went even worse in which Turkish 
origin people were forced to leave their homes and some of them had to do 
so.
60
 Furthermore, the Ulus reported that some Arabic newspapers had been 
making news to create disorder and provoke people against Turks.
61
 This 
news that the Ulus reported falsifies their own claims of support for Turkey 
from Syrian people. Moreover, it is hard to believe that the majority of Syrian 
Arabs would support Turkey when Syria lost its control over a territory.  
 
The turmoil in Syria continued, while the date for Hatay's status to come into 
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effect was approaching. Hatay's independent status was to be declared in 
November 29 and the new elections were expected to be held in December.
62
 
Although peaceful relations with France and trust between the two countries 
was consolidated with the new agreement on Hatay, the Ulus reported that 
Roger Garreau, the new High Commissioner's delegate for Hatay, had been 
provoking the non-Turks, especially the Circassians, to unite against Turks in 
the elections, although it was Garreau himself who at the same time warned 
people that voting for another constituent  -the other nations- was 
prohibited.
63
 The Ulus also reported that the delegate had threatened the 
Turkish officials for any possible reaction against a Syrian flag in the 
ceremony.
64
 Turkish President M. Kemal commented on the issue and said 
that it was a pity that Turks were not allowed to celebrate in a day that is 
worth to celebrate; “despite all these, first stage of the new regime in Hatay 
has started, no other way would have been possible and it will not be possible 
from now on”, he continued.65 
 
What was thought had come true and the ceremony was canceled.  Moreover, 
the High Commissioner of Syria did not attend the ceremony by not going to 
Hatay. According to the Ulus, security forces were used in order to dissolve 
the crowd that had gathered together to celebrate the new status of Hatay.
66
 
This somehow expected situation, however, did not hinder the celebrations in 
Ankara. People gathered in People's House at Ankara and celebrated Hatay's   
autonomy with a great enthusiasm emphasizing its assumed Turkishness.
67
 
The Ulus published three different poems by Behçet Kemal Çağlar, Nahide 
Balcı and Kamuran Bozkır, all of them signifying not so independent 
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independence of Hatay and its historical Turkishness.
68
  
 
In December 1, Ulus reported that Syrian parliament had refused to ratify the 
new agreement signed between Turkey and France.
69
 Although it was a 
significant move that one would need more elaboration; the Ulus chose to 
give it a very small place in the newspaper that would quite easily be 
neglected. This attitude can be explained by the Ulus’ fear that such news 
would harm the positive atmosphere in Turkey regarding the settlement of the 
dispute in favor of Turkey. It would also damage the perception of successful 
Turkish foreign policy. 
 
In response to Syria's move, Turkey did not extend the Treaty of Friendship, 
which was signed in 1926 with France with regard to Syria and Lebanon, and 
therefore terminated the treaty.
70
 Adding up to the tense diplomatic 
environment, the guideline for the elections in Hatay prepared by a 
commission in the LoN, which did not ask Turkey's views but only France's 
in the process. Turkey protested this situation in LoN.
71
 The Ulus commented 
on the issue and wrote that commission in Geneva had made a mistake and 
that there was a great amount of bias in the election guideline.
72
 
 
In the late February, news reporting the attacks to Turks started to flow. The 
Ulus reported that a small nationalist group had been established against 
Turks
73
 and that Turks were being prevented from registering for the 
elections.
74
 In the early April, clashes resulted in fatalities and gang attacks 
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started against Turks. In addition to the physical attacks, the Ulus claimed 
that National Bloc had been gathering Arabs from other cities or countries 
and register them for the upcoming elections.
75
 According to the Ulus, Arabic 
newspapers had started to provoke people against Turks but editor-in-chief 
was warning Turkish people for not responding this acts.
76
 It shows that 
Turkey did not want to exacerbate the situation by calling Turks to defend 
themselves. Turkey wanted to solve the problems with peaceful manners; 
otherwise, the result would be costly. As a result of a diplomatic note given to 
LoN
77, in Geneva it was accepted that “no Sunni Turks would be registered as 
an electorate for any other community”.78  
 
The incidence that happened in May 26, however, was the drop that spilled 
the cup. Roger Garreau, as a result of a suspicious death of two nationalist 
Arabs in Reyhaniye, raided Rehyaniye People's House, arrested several Turks 
and some houses were raided by the gendarmerie and the members of League 
of Nationalist Action (Usbat Al-'Amal Al-Qawmi – Usbetciler) who beat the 
residents.
79
 This violent act created severe discomfort in Ankara; Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Rüştü Aras pointed out the severity of the incidence; MP's 
were frustrated and the Ulus preferred a quiet aggressive language towards 
France
80
 and blamed Garreau for the incidence that happened and for the 
other ongoing attacks and maltreatment towards Turks.
81
 
 
This time France took the situation seriously and Foreign Minister Bonnet 
wanted maltreatment of the Turks to be stopped immediately.
82
 Garreau, after 
Bonnet’s order, had visited Turkey's Consul General in Hatay and reassured 
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that the preventive measures will be taken.
83
 Quick reaction from the French 
Foreign Minister may have prevented even bigger diplomatic problems to 
arise. Turkish PM Celal Bayar also expressed his positive feelings for the 
near future. In addition to the verbal guarantees, as a result of Turkey's 
demands, Garreau was dismissed from his position and a new delegate was 
appointed.
84
 Moreover, not only Abdurrahman Melek replaced French Hatay 
Governor in the following days, but also a Turkish Mayor was appointed.
85
 In 
order to negotiate Hatay's military situation deriving from the May 29 
agreement, Turkish Vice Chief of Defense and his French counterpart went to 
Hatay.
86
 The Ulus reported this news writing that crowds had chanted for 
Turkish army officials implying the loyalty of the Turks in Hatay to Turkey. 
Also, it continued to make news that was doubtful about France's neutrality.
87
 
 
New commission for the elections was formed and started its work in July 
22.
88
 In August 2, the new commission declared the exact numbers of 
electorates of each community/nation, which showed that Turks were the 
majority and they received 22 parliamentary seats out of 40.
89
 According to 
these numbers, Turks accounted for 35.847 voters whereas Alawites held 
11.319, Armenians 5.504, Arabs 1845 and Greek Orthodox 2098 voters.
90
 In 
September 2, Hatay parliament was opened and Tayfur Sökmen became the 
first president of Hatay.
91
 The Ulus, broadly covered the first days of 
independent Hatay and it emphasized Hatay's people loyalty to Turkey, it 
tried to make connections between Turkey and Hatay whenever possible.
92
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For instance, it published news that Hatay's national headgear was to be the 
modern hat, which symbolizes Kemalist reforms in Turkey.
93
 It also 
promoted the new regime in every occasion.  
 
Soon after the establishment of the new Republic of Hatay, rumors and 
discussions about its joining in Turkish territories had started. With all of its 
ups and downs of the newly founded Republic, Parliament of the Republic of 
Hatay voted for joining in Turkey. In June 30, 1939, Turkish Parliament 
ratified the treaty that led the joining of Hatay in Turkey
94
 and in July 13, the 
copies were handed out between France and Turkey, putting the treaty into 
force.
95
 After French soldiers left, Hatay has, both de-facto and de-jure, 
become Turkish province, in July 22.
96
 
 
In response to the irredentism claims against Turkey, Atay wrote that Turkey 
had no ambitious and aggressive expansion policies like the other states. 
According to him, Turkey only wanted to protect status quo and sustain 
peaceful environment in the region.
97
 The Ulus also made propaganda of the 
joining of Hatay into Turkey; it continuously reported news about the 
gratitude of the people in Hatay.
98
 There were not any negative views 
reported by the Ulus in this period as if all the constituents of Hatay had 
approved the annexation of their homeland. It is not that likely to expect 
Arabs to approve such a move, but the Ulus did not choose to mention such 
possible counter positions.  
 
The Ulus played a significant role on the implementation of the Turkey's 
Hatay policy. The Ulus’ attitude throughout the process had been nothing but 
reflection of the Republican government's policies. It always put emphasis on 
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peaceful relations between Turkey, France and Syria. It was mostly wary of 
making controversial claims or comments about Arabs in general but put the 
blame on the Syrian or French officials. The Ulus also made sure its readers 
that Turkish foreign policy had always been successfully operated and it tried 
to boost the enthusiasm towards Hatay and approval of Turkish foreign policy 
in the public, which has vital importance for a government to achieve its 
agenda.  
 
 
 
2.2. Relations With Egypt 
 
 
Political situation in Egypt in the 1930's could be described as suffering from 
the lack of stability, failed governments and political struggles between the 
parties with various political views. British mandate over Egypt shaped the 
everyday politics and remained as one of the fundamental reason for the 
political turmoil in the country. The Ulus closely followed the developments 
in Egypt and it defended Egypt's independence in their editorials. When it 
comes to controversial issues, the Ulus chose to be the mouthpiece of CHP 
government of Turkey.  
 
First significant cabinet crisis in 1930 aroused in June, which caused by the 
King Fuad's decision to authorize Sidqi Pasha to form the new government 
after the resignation of El-Nahhas Pasha of Wafd Party, despite Wafd Party's 
majority in the parliament.
99
 In June 21, Sidqi Pasha formed the government 
in the face of fierce opposition from Wafd.
100
 The Hakimiyet-i Milliye (HM)’s 
prominent Middle East commentator Zeki Mesut wrote that the cabinet crisis 
in Egypt was far from being natural since it would be hard to get the 
confidence of the majority in the Parliament. He supported Egyptian cause of 
independence by saying; “in the time of democracy and national sovereignty, 
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there is no doubt that 'nation' will be victorious”.101 
 
According to HM, public opinion was not supportive of Sidqi Pasha 
government and it blamed him for acting without relying on the majority in 
the Parliament. Moreover, HM required either the resignation of Sidqi Pasha 
or a new general election, which the newspaper doubted that Sidqi Pasha's 
People's Party could win.
102
 In an anonymous op-ed, but most probably Zeki 
Mesut considering the exact sentences with his previous piece, it was stated 
that the cabinet crisis had not been an ordinary one; the reason for it was the 
interruption of the ongoing negotiations between Egypt and Britain before the 
resignation of Al Nahhas Pasha. Negotiations were about Suez Canal and 
Sudan and when the negotiations failed, Al Nahhas Pasha resigned in order to 
start a new struggle against the British mandate. And again he argued that the 
will of the nation would be victorious.
103
 Mr. Mesut's position vis-à-vis the 
situation in Egypt, I argue, is in tandem with the Turkish foreign policy 
principle of respect for national sovereignty of states.  
 
With the call for act of disobedience by Wafd, street clashes started that 
caused several casualties including 15 deaths and 200 injuries.
104
 Unsigned 
op-ed seemed to supporting such obedience call, as part of HM’s support for 
independence of Turkey's neighbors.
105
 In the meantime, Sidqi Pasha 
responded to MacDonald's speech declaring that Egypt could protect the 
rights and lives of foreigners; that any foreign intervention would be 
unacceptable and that Britain must withdraw the ships she had sent.
106
 
 
HM, reported that security forces raided in the Parliament in order to prevent 
gathering of nationalists and as a result, Wafd called their followers to refuse 
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giving taxes to the government; in a manner of no taxation without 
representation.
107
 Anonymous op-ed, again probably Zeki Mesut, commented 
on the recent developments and argued that although the government seemed 
that it had taken the events under control, the situation did not seem 
sustainable considering their minority position in the parliament.
108
 In another 
op-ed, the author wrote that King Fuad declined the nationalists' demands to 
open the parliament for an extraordinary session, which boosted nationalists' 
enmity for the King. Furthermore, the author claimed that the problem had 
needed to be solved through international law.
109
 
 
When the rumors about King Farouk to visit Turkey were spread, HM made a 
phone call with the Egypt Ambassador to Turkey, who told that no 
information regarding a visit had been given to him. He further gave 
information about the trade between the two countries and told that Turkey's 
export, comprised of tobacco, fruits and railway sleepers, was exceeding her 
import from Egypt. He also denied the claims about raising tariffs for 
Turkey's export.
110
 Thanks to the interview, HM contributed to the perception 
of good relations between Turkey and Egypt, including Turkey's superiority 
over Egypt regarding trade volume. HM, shortly after, published M. Kemal's 
telegraph to King Farouk celebrating his birthday, which can be taken as an 
evidence for friendly relations that HM tried to show.
111
 
 
HM at first implicitly sided with the opposition members. On June 6, 
however, in an anonymous report published in the newspaper about the 
Egypt’s 1931 elections and two competing political figures Nahhas Pasha and 
Sidqi Pasha, HM seemed to be siding with Sidqi Pasha by praising his 
education and expertise in finance.
112
 It argued that Wafd Party had known 
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that they would not be able to mobilize the people. Anonymous author also 
argued that whenever Nahhas Pasha appeared, there emerged disorder.
113
 
Moreover, the author implied that the Egyptian people were too ignorant to 
be asked to vote. 
 
What explains this change? Why did HM chose to promote Sidqi Pasha’s 
statesmen skills and talk about the ignorance of the Egyptian people, who 
were the main actors of the pre-election protests that HM described it as 
“almost revolutionary”? My answer to that would be the prospect of Wafd 
Party’s victory in the elections became impossible and the newspaper 
probably did not want to create tensions with the prospective Prime Minister 
of Egypt that is Sidqi Pasha. Pragmatic attitude of HM is probably the most 
viable explanatory factor for such an inconsistency within a short period of 
time. Besides, reports about the political situation in Egypt dramatically 
declined after the elections, to the extent that there is a little coverage of the 
post-election political environment.  This fact may also support my 
conjecture since coverage of the post-election protests or turmoil in Egypt in 
a supportive manner could harm Turkish-Egyptian relations. 
 
After a few couple of months of silence with regard to Turkish-Egyptian 
relations and its coverage by HM, an incident created a diplomatic crisis 
between the two countries. It is known as the “Fez Case”. The incident took 
place in the reception given by Turkey for the Republican Day on October 29, 
1932. There are several accounts for the incident. According to British 
Ambassador to Turkey George Clerk, Egyptian Ambassador Abdulmelik 
Hamza Bey sits with his fez on his head. Turkish Hat Law forbids Turkish 
citizens to wear a fez. While passing along, M. Kemal approaches him and 
says, “tell your majesty that I, M. Kemal, ordered you to put off your fez”. M. 
Kemal then calls the waitress and ambassador gives his fez to him.
114
 Tevfik 
Rüştü Aras, however, gives somewhat a different testimony. According to 
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him, M. Kemal approached him to say that he had allowed him to put his fez 
off in order to make himself comfortable without any inconvenience.
115
 
 
Egypt Foreign Minister Yahya Pasha tells a story that is close to Sir George 
Clerk’s account, in which M. Kemal orders the ambassador to put off his fez 
and calls the waitress to make him do so.
116
 Turkish and Egyptian newspapers 
at the time did not report such a case immediately after the incident. British 
Daily Herald, however, reported the incident on November 11, which both 
Anatolian Agency and Cairo denied.
117
 After that, Egyptian newspapers and 
the opposition Wafd Party showed utmost interest to the incident and put 
pressure on the government to deal with the problem.
118
 Egypt sent a 
diplomatic note to Turkey and demanded a guarantee for the future that it 
would allow ambassadors to wear fez.
119
  
 
Until the first diplomatic note, Turkish newspapers remained silent, including 
HM. On 6
th
 of December, HM harshly criticized the Egyptian newspapers on 
their accounts of the incident. According to HM, the belated interest of the 
Egyptian newspapers towards the incident was suspicious and there must 
have been some people who wanted to harm the good relations of the two.
120
 
In the editorial of HM it was written that there was no such dramatic incident 
as the Egyptian newspapers portrayed it misleadingly. According to them, M. 
Kemal wanted participants to be relaxed since they have been wearing their 
official clothes throughout the day. Therefore, they argued, M. Kemal 
allowed them to be comfortable. And while passing along side the Egyptian 
ambassador, M. Kemal told him the same and allowed him to take off his fez. 
Therefore, there was nothing humiliating, and those who wanted to incite 
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crisis between the two exploited the event after two weeks of its occurrence, 
they argued
121
 Moreover, HM implied that Britain was also responsible for 
inciting the crisis. In the following day, HM cited the Cumhuriyet’s news 
about the incident, which accounted the event with almost the same wordings 
as HM. In the news, the Cumhuriyet also implied the probable role of the mal 
intentions of the British governments to harm the relations of the two 
countries.
122
 
 
On December 7, Foreign Minister Aras gave a briefing to the Republican 
People’s Party (CHP) about the diplomatic note given by Egypt and the 
respond that the government had been planning to give. Party members and 
thus, the parliament, approved the way the government planned to deal with 
the problem, which was to stay within the International Law and act with 
good intentions.
123
 HM, by citing the editor-in-chief of the Cumhuriyet, for 
the first time explicitly blamed the British government for deliberately 
inciting a crisis between the two countries.
124
 
 
Turkish government and HM continued to blame the Egyptian newspapers for 
exploiting false news created by a British newspaper. Artvin MP Mehmet 
Asım Bey went further and wrote a piece for the Vakit that was also published 
by HM and blamed the Egyptian government for its indirect support for the 
“elements” that were harmful for the Turkish regime and he continued to 
blame them for opening up their market to the new places which resulted a 
decline in Turkey’s export to Egypt.125 It was for the first time that an official 
directly blamed the Egyptian government, which took the process to a new 
phase.  
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Turkey sent her response via mail to Egypt on December 9.
126
 Turkish 
newspapers took a harsh stance towards their Egyptian counterparts and 
warned them to stop using false news and criticizing M. Kemal unjustly. 
They also expected that the crisis would end with the diplomatic note that 
was sent by Turkey.
127
 Turkey preferred to use a calm language and 
responded Egypt’s demand by saying that states were free to choose their 
official uniforms. Turkish officials also noted that states were free to adopt 
their own protocols, too.
128
 When Numan Menemencioğlu asked about what 
they meant in their response, he elaborated on it and said that Turkey was to 
keep her right to have a dress code in order to prevent any outrage in the 
public against the fez.
129
 
 
HM made a phone call with the Egypt’s ambassador to Turkey, Abdulmelik 
Hamza in which he told that there were several misunderstandings regarding 
the incident and he hoped that the crisis that concerned only two countries 
would be solved by the two.
130
 Soon after, Egypt worded a new response with 
the guidance of Sir Percy Loraine that did not require an answer. In the note it 
was written that Egypt was assuming Turkey’s response as a guarantee for the 
fez. On December 28, the response handed in to the Turkey’s chargé 
d'affaires and HM believed that the crisis would soon be resolved.
131
 
 
After the crisis was peacefully resolved, relations between the two countries 
were normalized. Signs of the normalization in the case of HM started with 
the piece written by Maurice Barres about Cairo.
132
 Even more importantly, a 
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visit made by a group of journalists and doctors to Ankara and its wide 
coverage by the newspaper was a sign of true normalization. HM gave the 
accounts of the journalist about their admiration of Turkey’s progress within 
a short period of time and words of praise for M. Kemal.
133
 With regard to 
normalization and improvement of the relations, İffet Halim wrote that both 
countries needed more articles about each other to be published in order to 
have a better mutual understanding. She also made comparisons between the 
two countries about the condition of women. According to her, Egyptian 
women admired their Turkish counterparts, and they have taken Turkish 
women as an example for themselves. One comment she made about the 
women movements in Egypt -she actually made these comparisons through 
the information she gathered from an Egyptian man- needs even more 
attention for which it exposes her views on Turkish women and how it could 
be a correct example for Egypt as well. She tells him that in Turkey there was 
no feminism per se, but a movement that found its roots from ancient 
Anatolia and derived from a “Gazian View" [Gazice Görüş] and asks whether 
Egypt has a similar movement.
134
 She then writes with a pity that women 
movement in Egypt was not anything more than feminism. According to her, 
these words should be of interest to men rather than women and they should 
not struggle with which rights women will get or take. Instead, they should be 
focusing on “raising their women”.135  
 
As İffet Halim’s ideas important as they reveal Kemalist view on women 
rights and movements in general, they are also important in the sense that 
Turkish experience was wanted to be presented as an appropriate way for the 
Egyptians to adopt. Egyptians were seen as those who are in the beginning of 
the road to independence and state building. Turkey in this sense did not 
remain completely deaf or blind towards it; rather, mostly with its 
intellectuals tried to influence them using its own experience. 
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With the emergence of the threat of Italy to invade Abyssinia, relations 
between Britain and Egypt needed to be revised, in favor of Egypt, argued 
Burhan Belge. According to him, Britain could even decide to negotiate with 
Wafdists, who were deeply against the British rule over Egypt.
136
 Soon after, 
however, Belge’s prediction turned out to be immature with the passionate 
speech of Nahhas Pasha against the British rule in which he clearly rejected 
negotiations with Britain.
137
 His speech led to violent protests that resulted 
with several casualties.
138
  
 
Starting with 1936, we see a tendency towards positive relations between 
Egypt and Turkey. In this period, visits from Egypt to Turkey and several op-
ed pieces and news regarding the relations between the two were published. 
First, the Ulus published the letter of the owner of an Egyptian newspaper 
consisted of praise words for Turkey and her regime, the brotherhood 
between the two countries.
139
 In June 27, the Ulus cited a piece from the Al- 
Mukattam, which criticized the Ottoman regime and again praised the new 
regime.
140
 This positive atmosphere followed by a visit of some university 
students and professors from Egypt to Çanakkale, where professors lectured 
their students about the military successes of M. Kemal.
141
 Their visit 
attracted attention in the Ulus and Burhan Belge wrote that although 
independence movements might have started as Turk, it could not remain as 
Turk only. According to him, Ataturk would inspire Egyptians.
142
 On August 
17, in a piece by Necmeddin Nasf for the Al-Ahram, “unbreakable relations” 
between the two, the importance of the visit paid by the Egyptian students, 
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Turkey’s success and its possible impact to Egypt were highlighted.143 
 
Moreover, the Ulus made an interview with a woman intellectual of Egypt at 
the time, Huneyna Huri, about her book about the women of Egypt and its 
surrounding neighborhood. After talking widely about the impressive 
condition of women in Turkey, including their role in public, accessibility to 
several jobs; she could not help her but realize something surprising, which 
was the right to join the military for women. She even went further and said, 
“I wish I was a Turk! I would immediately join the military. What a divine 
work for a woman!”144 Her enthusiasm towards Turkish military, of course, 
was expected to resonate with the Turkish readers. It is safe to argue that the 
Ulus made use of this news to create a feeling among the Turkish readers that 
the foreign countries perceived Turkey and its regime as successful. When 
these comments come from the previously Ottoman lands in the East, it was 
even more important, since the Ulus could be able to make a comparison 
between those countries and Turkey to show the degree of success that 
Turkey achieved under the leadership of Ataturk.  
 
The positive atmosphere between the two again started to lose its acceleration 
mainly because of the publications in the Egyptian newspapers that fiercely 
criticized Turkey, which is understandable to a certain extent as it might had 
brought back the Ottoman period in the minds of the Arab people. The Ulus, 
however, did not really respond to that publications but rather chose to give 
place to those who voiced moderate arguments in Egypt. For instance, on 
January 21 the Ulus cited a newspaper from Egypt that urged people to be 
more sensitive about the news against Turkey.
145
 These short-lived attacks, 
however, did not severely affect the relations.  
 
When we turn back to the political environment of Egypt and its reflection in 
Turkey, it is clear that Turkey never wanted to side directly with any of the 
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political actors in the country. Instead Turkey sought to adopt herself to the 
new situations derived after several crises within the country and again tried 
to adapt her strategies according to the power relations in Egypt. Mostly, 
Turkey preferred to support policies that would make Egyptians better off, 
like independence from Britain, full membership of League of Nations and 
political stability in the country. The clearest examples of such position came 
from A. Şükrü Esmer, an op-ed writer for the Ulus, who showed his support 
to Egypt for several times for abolition of capitulations and League of 
Nations membership.
146
 We may also add editor-in-chief Atay’s support for 
the membership, as evidence for my argument.
147
 
 
Turkey and Egypt signed a treaty of friendship on April 8, after several ups 
and downs in their relationship.
148
 On April 22, the Ulus published the 
articles of the treaty in a full page with the caption saying “Friendship of 
Turkey and Egypt”149 that followed by friendly statements from the two 
countries after the treaty.
150
 We understand that the treaty increased the 
interest towards Egypt because Burhan Belge started to write a series about 
Egypt’s cultural, geographical, social and political characteristics.151 
 
As the Wafd Party lost the elections, which was a result of several other 
cabinet crises, the Ulus quickly adapted itself to the new political 
environment. A. Şükrü Esmer commented on the situation wrote that it was a 
new turn in the Egyptian history.
152
 Turkey also rapidly responded to the new 
political power balance in the country and Minister of Foreign Affairs paid an 
official visit to Egypt, and he was the first Minister of Foreign Affairs to visit 
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Egypt after the elections.
153
 The following day, the Ulus reported that the 
King admitted Aras, and that Egyptian newspapers had been making friendly 
publications about the visit.
154
 A. Şükrü Esmer also commented on the visit 
and pointed out the words that King Faruq had used for the Turkish Minister, 
which were: “We do not greet you as foreigners but as a friendly brother”.155 
According to him, these were not stated in a diplomatic manner, instead, 
those words actually flowing from his heart. He also commented on the 
decision that was made by the Egyptian political parties to establish a national 
unity government, which excluded Wafd Party, and perceived it as a mature 
move for the Egyptian politics and stated his contentment. 
156
 
 
Relations with Egypt had its ups and downs. It never, however, resulted in 
completely hostile attitudes between the two. Republican elites made use of 
social and political environment of Egypt whenever possible. Turkey under 
the leadership of Ataturk was presented as an ideal example for Egypt. Social 
problems in Egypt created opportunity for the elites to make comparison 
between the two countries to prove that Turkey was doing much better. 
Pragmatism of the Turkish regime successfully managed to make use of any 
situation it encountered. This chapter on Egypt clearly proves such elasticity. 
 
 
 
 
2.3. The Palestine Question in the Ulus 
 
 
The Palestine Question starts to appear in the Ulus in early 1934. According 
to the Ulus, the question was between not only two competing races or 
religions, but also two rival civilizations. We have enough data to show that 
the Ulus believed the Jews represented the modernized, westernized and 
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developed society, whereas the Arabs perceived as the traditional, rural and 
under-developed civilization.  
 
There were significant amount of news about the Jewish immigration around 
the globe, but mostly from Europe, to Palestine. The Ulus supported the view 
that migrated Jews had industrial capabilities and know-how; therefore they 
could contribute to the development process of the country.
157
 For instance, in 
an article that the Ulus translated from the Neue Freie Presse, the author 
argues that the Palestine Question was only small portion of the actual Jewish 
Question in the world. He further argued that, there was no unemployment in 
Palestine since the arrival of the Jews.
158
 Another example to support this 
position could be another article published by the Ulus from a foreign 
newspaper in which the author goes:  
Those who revolt against each other are not only two races but also 
two civilizations. As Arabs represent a civilization that can hardly 
develop, Jews represent the European modernism in its bravest 
shape. In Palestine, Jews thanks to their just mere existence, their 
diligence and capabilities, have been creating a new social and 
moral order, which is hard to sustain against an Arab world that is 
inwardly traditional.
159
 
 
Examples that reinforce the idea that Jews are the developed and modernized 
civilization and Arabs are backward and underdeveloped is not rare in the 
Ulus. In another article cited from the Sunday Times, the author argues that 
Jews were the only driving force behind the recent development process in 
Palestine. He author went further to argue that Arabs had been proliferated 
via their high birth rates to suggest that the increasing Jewish population via 
immigration should not be a matter of concern. He then wanted to give some 
credits to Arabs as well, which could easily be taken as a racist statement, and 
argued that although “the Arab peasants were ignorant”, there were “smart 
and cunning entrepreneurs” among them.160 
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It is fair to argue that the Ulus covered the Palestine Question mostly from the 
eyes of the Jews. In most of the pieces about Palestine, Arabs were portrayed 
as the “terrorists”161 and the ones who caused all the violent incidences. 
When the Jews started to retaliate, however, the Ulus tended to cover those 
incidences as well. We can still, however, argue that the Ulus’ editorial 
position had been biased, as we can understand from their view, which 
suggested that Arabs represented the backward and under-developed 
civilization, whereas Jews represented the contrary.  
 
There are several reports, in which the Ulus informed its readers about the 
deteriorating situation of Jews that was caused by violent Arabs.
162
 We do not 
really know if the Jews responded to these violent attacks or not until the 
Ulus started to publish news on Jewish retaliation. It seems rather unrealistic 
to assume that the only problem was the Arabs that terrorized the whole 
country. What we know is that, as retaliation from the Jewish side became 
systematic, then the Ulus started to cover those attacks as well.
163
 In an article 
translated from its original, published in the La Tribune, Jews were accused 
of forming gangs and attacking Arabs. According to the author, things had 
gotten worse as the Jews started to response in the same way.
164
 As these 
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examples can be taken as the Ulus’ objective coverage of the violent event, 
they are not enough to falsify our argument that the Ulus was biased in 
general against the Arab population in Palestine.  
 
As the Palestine Question got more and more attention, Burhan Belge started 
to write op-ed series from Palestine. His views towards the question and the 
two parties in general, reveals the biased attitude of the Ulus against Arabs. 
For instance, as he travelled from Egypt to Palestine via plane, he wrote that 
he knew that the lands below the plane historically belonged to the Jews from 
the time of Moses; “We even knew that those messy and shapeless green 
places belonged to the Arabs, and those perfectly shaped places belonged to 
the Jews”.165 It is obvious that according to Belge, the words “order”, or 
“aesthetic” and Arabs were oxymoron, since he knew that those messy places 
were belonged to the Arabs even before landing. The narrative that the Jews 
symbolizing the Western modernism and Arabs representing the backward 
traditionalism was being reproduced. In the second piece, he wrote that in 
Jerusalem there were some places that had been changed and some places that 
remained untouched. Not surprisingly, he argued that those changed were 
belonged to the Jews and places that remained the same belonged to the 
traditional Arabs
166
 that represented a civilization, which can hardly change. 
 
But little can be more blunt than what Belge says in his third piece of the op-
ed series from Palestine. He starts his op-ed by telling the same old story that 
is Jews bringing a superior civilization to Palestine. He writes that when they, 
the Jews, arrived, they started to buy lands from Arabs. Arabs first rejected, 
but when the Jews offered five times, ten times and twenty times more than 
the original price, Arabs sold their lands. Then, Arabs wanted a law 
prohibiting people from selling lands to the Jews. According to Belge, this 
situation was a sign of a lack of morality. If they had had necessary morals, 
they would not have sold their lands for money at the first place. But when 
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the offer is high, then morals vanish, he argues. Then Arabs invest their 
money to cars, houses, marriages and divorces; namely things that would not 
make any profit in the long run.
167
 Basically, Belge accuses Arabs for not 
having morality and then he goes further and blames Arabs for being one of 
the reasons that created the Palestine Question by selling their lands for 
money.  
 
Palestine Question has also been exploited as any other phenomenon in the 
Ulus to give credit or justify the Kemalist regime in Turkey. For instance, he 
mentions his visit to first Mufti of Jerusalem and then to one of the executives 
of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, Moshe Shertok. He compares these two 
figures and says, the former represents the power of faith while the latter 
represents power of science, as a graduate of Oxford
168
 who holds both 
Economy and Law degrees. He then makes an inference and says, “I 
compared Mufti’s power of faith and Shertok’s power of science, and then I 
realized one more time the deep meaning of Kemalizm”.169 
 
In another piece, when Belge talks about interfaith conflicts he says that it is 
unacceptable especially for a Kemalist. He says, “Our chief [Şef] has 
transformed Hagia Sophia into a museum from a mosque in order to stop the 
unnecessary fight between Orthodox Christianity and Sunni Islam. There is 
no solution another than turning whole Palestine to a museum.” 
 
As we have seen from the previous sections, the Ulus and its contributors 
tend to made use of the problems in the Arab lands and compare Turkey’s 
“advanced” position with regard to her Middle Eastern counterparts. And 
Palestine Question is no exception in this sense. This deliberate political 
move is to show the readers that without Kemalist credentials; Turkey could 
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have been in a much worse position as a remnant of the former Ottoman 
Empire. The Palestine Question was particularly being used to show 
detrimental impacts of religion. Since Kemalizm have controversial views 
towards religion and since these views, particularly in the early Republican 
period, backlashed in the society, these Republican elites might have felt the 
need to find supporting evidence for their views from the former Ottoman 
lands and Islamic societies. It is fair to read, therefore, Belge’s words as a 
reflection of such a need. 
 
Although the Ulus had controversial views on Arabs and favorable views on 
Jews, this bias did not lead any open support for Jewish land in Palestine. 
Maybe not surprisingly, the Ulus also did not support Arab cause and did not 
perceive their fight as independence fight against Jewish immigration led by 
British forces. The Ulus reported news about the presence of the British army 
and the increase of the numbers of British troops in Palestine. However, the 
Ulus did not show any sign of discomfort. Interesting enough, while the 
ferocious treatment the Jews faced in Germany did not get any reaction from 
the Ulus, and it is regarded as an internal affair of Germany, the Palestine 
Question must not had been seen internal enough for them.  In the previous 
section we have seen that the Ulus supported Egypt against the British control 
over the country, at least in a rhetorical level. This time, the Ulus seems to 
have no apparent preference over the question. The reason for that could be 
the complexity of the problem, and the Ulus might have hesitated to harm the 
relations with Britain. Again, the Ulus adapted its editorial stance according 
to the cautious foreign policy of Turkey.  
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3. THE LANGUAGE REFORM IN TURKEY: THE WAR ON ARABIC 
WORDS AND THE SCRIPT 
 
 
 
 
On November 3, 1928, a law on new Turkish letters came into effect. With 
this new law, Turkey started to use the Latin alphabet instead of the Arabic 
script. This reform created enormous complexities in society, since the 
literacy rate was already low, adapting a new alphabet dramatically lowered 
this rate in one night. Literacy rate especially dropped in the rural areas.
170
 
Moreover, it was not only a reform on communication. Language has been 
the most vital apparatus of the nation states to create a national identity. Feroz 
Ahmad calls this move, changing the script, as the most “iconoclastic reform 
of this period”.171 Script change was later on followed by language 
purification process in Turkey, and this reform forms the main body of this 
chapter.  
 
Language is not only an apparatus that facilitates communication among 
people. If it were, translating from one language from another would be an 
easy job. However, languages contain the traces of the memories of 
communities and nations.
172
 Culture and identity of a community intersects 
within the language of that society.
173
 Ndhlovu, for instance, has showed the 
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importance of the Zimbabwe’s top-down language policy in an effort to build 
a nation-state and the ties with language and identities of the different ethnic 
minorities.
174
 Therefore language policies of the states give insights on the 
political motives of the rulers and the identity that is wanted to be created. 
 
Turkish example is not an exception. Script change and the purification 
process must be treated as deliberate actions to shape a national identity. In 
the Turkish case, it is mostly argued that M. Kemal enacted the law on new 
Turkish letters in order to cut the cultural ties with the Islamic societies and 
turn the nation’s face towards a world that is modern, secular and 
Westernized. According to Sadoğlu, Kemalism was expecting a mentality 
change in the long term. Moreover, with the efforts towards purification of 
the language, Kemalist regime tried to change the language, and therefore the 
nation that is to be articulated with Western and secular world.
175
 Lewis too, 
supports the idea that the script change intended to end the relations with the 
Islamic East and facilitate a better communication with the Western world.
176
 
Zürcher offers a similar explanation and writes that the purpose was 
ideologically oriented and the reform meant to break Turkey up from the 
Middle East and Islamic traditions of the Ottoman Empire.
177
 In the same 
vein Bernard Lewis argues that although the Arab scripts were burdensome 
for Turkish, the aim was more than “practical or pedagogical”. It was a move 
that slammed the door on the past and it was a final break with the East, 
according to him.
178
 He argues that motives for the script change included 
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nationalist ideas and it was to liberate Turkish from yet another tie with 
Eastern, medieval culture, by liberating it from the Ottoman language.
179
 
Authors from the 1930s argue the same. For instance, Ragıp Özden writes, 
“our great leader destroyed the roads and bridges between the old and new 
generations, thus, he made it impossible to turn back to the Eastern-Islamic 
world”.180 As a proof to these similar views, M. Kemal claims that the 
language reform was a must to “erase the mistakes of the past” and to “side 
with the civilized world”.181  
 
Script change in Turkey is also significant given the Islamic connotation of 
the Arabic script contains. El Bakri rightfully writes: 
The intricate connection of language, and by extension, its 
script, with notions of identity is particularly strong in the case 
of Arabic...Arabic and the way it is written have a central 
importance to Islam as a common language uniting a 
community of believers in daily worship and social 
interactions. The language of the Qur'an set the standard for a 
unified literary language in contrast to the various dialects of 
Arabia. Regardless of their mother tongues, Muslims of 
diverse backgrounds memorize and recite the Qur'an, as well 
as various supplications and prophetic traditions, in Arabic.
 182
 
 
As we see, the Arabic script is perceived more than an ordinary set of letters; 
the way it is written is strictly associated with Holy Qur’an. It would be naïve 
to assume that Kemalist cadres did not know such reference. In harmony with 
the ultimate goal of severing the identity level relations with the Arab world, 
changing the Arabic script meant more than a matter of communication. 
Aside from the cultural purposes, one can argue, changing the Arabic script 
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was carried out as a result of the secularization policy of M. Kemal.  
 
When we look at the language purification process, the words that were 
purified or replaced by the Turkish ones, they were overwhelmingly Arabic 
and Persian. Of course, one reason for that was words with Arabic and 
Persian root outnumbered the words borrowed from the Western languages. 
However, as Sadoğlu argues, most of the Western rooted words were immune 
to the purification process because there was a concern that if they were to 
remove foreign words from the language, the ties with the Western world 
could have been damaged.
183
 The reform was carried out not only with a 
nationalist motivation but also with the aim of Westernization.
184
 The 
technical changes that were undertaken as part of the language reform made it 
extremely hard, if not impossible, to pronounce the Arabic and Persian rooted 
words correctly; and according to Sadoğlu, this was a deliberate step.185 
 
In this period, discussions with regard to purification process reached its 
peak. Numbers of studies, most of them can be disregarded as unscientific, 
books and articles published to prove the originality and strength of the 
Turkish language. Most of the studies attacked the Arabic language, degraded 
it as being “not that deep as it had been thought” and suggested that it should 
be replaced by Turkish, which is “pure as water and bright as sun”186, and 
claimed that most of the words in Arabic language actually had Turkish 
origin.
187
 Thus, it is fair to argue that Turkish language reform was directly 
related to the perception towards the Arabs, since, as noted, the language is 
directly associated with the nation itself.  
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Since the old script was Arabic and the region that M. Kemal wanted to turn 
his back to was mostly Arab populated, Turkey’s language reform and the 
discussions during the language purification process reveals the perception 
towards not only the Arabic language, but also the original speakers of the 
language, namely the Arabs. Therefore, records from this process offer 
significant insights and it is legitimate to treat it as a vital part of this thesis. 
In this period, the Hakimiyet-i Milliye -later on the Ulus- played an important 
role through facilitating a countrywide campaign for purification of the 
language. It announced several Arabic or Persian rooted words every day in 
its pages in order to find equivalent words in Turkish. It expected 
participation from its readers to contribute to the process. It also published 
several op-eds, and special anonymous series titled “Dil Yazıları”, whose 
author later on proved to be M. Kemal.
188
  
 
What we understand from the op-eds in the Hakimiyet-i Milliye and the Ulus 
is that founders of the Republic were quite uncomfortable with how the 
Ottoman Empire had treated Turkish language and the Turks in general. 
There are several pieces in the newspaper that refers to the Ottoman practices 
of “insulting” the Turkish identity. Republican elites used and exploited such 
practices and tried to create a new Turkish identity through empowering the 
Turkish language. Thus, one should always bear in mind that traumatic 
memories from the Ottoman Empire has an important impact on the language 
policies and such practices served to create counter narratives to strengthen 
the Turkish identity.  
 
For instance, Falih Rıfkı mentions how the Turkish language and the Turks 
were perceived as impolite in the Ottoman period.
189
 Similarly, Samih Rifat 
referred to the Ottoman period in his inaugural speech at the First Language 
Convention and argued that Ottomans neglected the Turks and the Turks 
were the most disliked among the constituents of the Ottoman Empire. He 
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further argued that the Ottoman elite despised the Turkish language.
190
 
Another telling example of how the Ottoman Empire treated the Turkish 
identity and how the new Republic will fix the situation and put the Turkish 
identity to the place where it actually deserves can be found in another op-ed 
by Falih Rıfkı. He argued that the Ottoman language was “as crippled as the 
Ottoman state itself”. The Ottoman language too was an absurd blend of 
Eastern and Western civilizations. In the Ottoman Palace, Turks were the 
least ranked officials, comparing to Arabs, Albanians and Kurds, for that 
matter.
191
 He implies that the new Republic changed this status and made 
Turkish identity the superior one against others, and now the same was the 
case for the Turkish language.  
 
Examples that reveal the negative perceptions of Republican elites towards 
the Arabic language and Arabs are not scarce in the Ulus. Halit Ziya for 
instance, argued that Arabic was “like a tombstone that is stuck in the plane 
tree across the park”, in which the plane tree meant to be the Turkish 
language.
192
 Ibrahim Necmi, on the other hand, after comparing Turkish with 
other major Western languages and arguing that Turkish is the “most neat” 
one, did not hesitate to conclude that the biggest trouble Turkish had has been 
to be blended with Arabic.
193
  
 
Such perceptions against Arabs sometimes reached to a level of racist claims. 
For instance Mehmet Şeref wrote that the greatest pride Turkish language 
owned was the truth that it was not a language of “brownnosers”. He then 
said: 
You cannot find Arab’s endlessly long qasidas like Arabic lies, 
in the Turkish language. Because; Turkish language is not a 
language of brownnosers. When an Arab praise someone, he 
makes up phrases through his boiling head under the scorching 
sun in the middle of a desert and exalt the one who is praised; 
this is something that Turkish language cannot do. Mother 
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tongue [Turkish] is the language of a race that is superior, 
more elegant and thoughtful.
194
 
  
Three days later, he writes another op-ed and argues:   
Turks converted to the Arab’s religion only when they [Turks] 
became the master. The Turk shot the Arab without thinking, 
who tried to make the Turk a slave. Only when the Arab 
submitted, the Turk embraced Arab’s language and religion, by 
choice. After a never ending war for 1300 years came the 
Ghazi and saved his language from the desert Arab’s 
captivity.
195
 
 
It is quite interesting to see how he personalizes a mythical narrative and refer 
to whole Arab and Turkish people as a one single person. I believe that it is a 
deliberate choice in order to make the narrative more heroic. Moreover, I also 
cannot help myself but notice the way that he refers to Islam, as “Arab’s 
religion”. Again, I believe the language he uses is a deliberate choice to show 
how alien such identities to the Turks. One should also notice the master and 
slave relationship between the Arabs and the Turks. Turkish Republican elite 
perceives Turks as the master, therefore rendering Arabs in a position of a 
slave. This language contains imperialist and racist connotations in which 
Turks are the superior and the Arabs are inferior. 
 
This is not the only example of a personalization of the language or Turkish 
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identity. Most of the time the Arabic language is portrayed as an enemy that 
attacks to the Turkish language or Turkish language portrayed as a person 
that is captured by the Arabic language.
196
 Nothing can be more bizarre, 
however, than Ziya Talat’s short story with regard to personalization of the 
Turkish language. In his story, Talat portrays a young and beautiful girl with 
a headscarf who knocks the door of a famous poet in the middle of the night. 
The poet is described as in his eighties and at the end of his life. He opens the 
door, takes the girl in and ask her questions about her and her family and try 
to understand why they let her go. She then explains that her father mistreats 
her. After a while of questioning, in which he fails to make sense of her 
answers, he yells asking, “What are you?” Then she suddenly takes her 
headscarf and says, “I am the Turkish language!” She then complains about 
the mistreatment she has been facing through Arabic and Persian words. After 
several “emotional” sentences, the poet feels very guilty and dies within a 
week.
197
  
 
Among the other things, it is crucial to understand that what the characters in 
the story represented in the real life. Basically, the father figure represents the 
Ottoman Empire whereas the poet represents the Ottoman intellectuals. The 
state figure, in Turkish political culture has always been represented as a 
father and the most apparent version of such representation is the phrase 
“father state”. It is beyond the boundaries of thesis but state as a “father” 
important to show the authority of the state with a reference to the traditional 
family values. In the story, the young and neglected Turkish language blames 
the Ottoman intellectuals for using Arabic and Persian words, leaving Turkish 
in a poor state. And when it comes to the representation of the Turkish 
language as a young and naïve girl, one should bear in mind the traditional 
gender roles. Women are considered as individuals who need protection 
against others; namely, they should not be “tainted”. They should remain pure 
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and belong to the masculine “owner”. Women also considered being the 
“honor” of their “owner”. Thus, the portrayal of the Turkish language as a 
young girl is a deliberate choice in order to make the story more influential 
and to show how the language is deprived of protection against Arabic. 
 
As noted, fight for purification of the Turkish language is mostly directed 
against Arabic words. Examples from the Ulus, shows the way the elites 
perceived the Arabic words. I argue that this is not only a matter of language 
but also matter of identity. Previous examples proved this point by the way 
Arabs were degraded through their language. In the beginning of the chapter, 
I also noted that M. Kemal and other Republican elites expected long-term 
results. Such long-term expectations signify the break-up from the Arabic 
influence over the Turkish identity. For instance, in an anonymous op-ed the 
author writes that they “deliberately throw away the words that Arabic letters 
brought” and that they “whittle down from the root those that resist and put 
them in an unrecognizable shape”. By this way, he continues, next 
generations would not know the Arabic words.
198
 Moreover, Falih Rıfkı 
announce with pleasure that kids who don’t know any Arabic letter has 
exceeded half million. According to him, this new generation who did not 
know any Arabic letter or fez was the backbone of the revolution.
199
 
Similarly, when someone asked whether or not to teach his child Arabic 
letters in order to find a job in the state level, Mümtaz Faik Fenik responded 
with utter anger and wrote, “No, we will not throw the Turkish child again to 
a hell like that… Are we going to turn a generation, which did not see any 
headgear other than hat, into an Ottoman?”200 It is striking to see how 
republican elite reacts against Arabic language. This situation does not seem 
to be normal; therefore identity must be an explanatory factor for their attack 
against Arabic. One should also notice that how regime treats children as the 
target audience. In this vein, Yılmaz says: 
Alphabet reform especially targeted the small children who 
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had no or little cultural ties with the Ottoman regime and its 
identity. Consolidation of the rapid changes in the early 
republican era heavily depended upon these children. The 
regime strictly controlled them to prevent them learning Arabic 
letters, especially through Qur’an classes.201 
 
In the Ulus, it is possible to see more clear examples of the importance of the 
Turkish identity when it comes to language. Elites wanted to get rid off the 
Arabic language because they wanted to be part of the Western hemisphere. 
For instance, Çanakkale MP Cevat Bey in the 2nd Language Convention tried 
to prove that Turkish was part of the Indo-European language family.
202
 In a 
similar vein, while explaining the necessity of removing Arabic words from 
the Turkish language he justified his position by arguing that Turks are from 
completely different and opposite culture than the Arabs. He further argued 
that Turks couldn’t read any Arabic word without falter.203  
 
Interesting enough, while attacking and degrading Arabic, the Ulus tried to 
prove that Arabic derived from Turkish. During the purification process, 
especially in the Language Conventions, several authors and scientists tried to 
prove that Turkish was one of the oldest languages in the world. This view, 
later on turned into a grand theory called the Sun Language Theory and 
argued that Turkish was the first language in the history of civilizations and 
all the modern languages actually derived from Turkish. For instance, Konya 
MP Naim Hazım argues that Arabic is formed by Turkish roots. He even goes 
on to say that Arabs might have taken their names from Turks and that there 
is a possibility for them to be Turk in their origin.
204
 He then starts a new 
series in the Ulus to prove that Arabic completely derived from Turkish. 
Moreover, he blames Arabic philologists for failing to address this truth.
205
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His “thesis” became one of the most important theses of the 2nd Language 
Convention.
206
 This thesis could work as a useful tool for the words that is 
hard to remove from the language, since they are fundamental to Turkish. We 
see such examples during the purification process. The words that could not 
be replaced with a pure Turkish and that are fundamentally important were 
left in the language by arguing that they were originally Turkish.
207
 
 
It is contradictory in nature to both degrade Arabic language and then try to 
prove that it is originated from Turkish. While Naim Hazım tried to prove 
that Arabic derived from Turkish, others continued to attack Arabic for being 
a weak language. For them, Arabic was so weak to the degree that although it 
was supposed to be a language of religion for the Eastern nations, it even 
lacked an appropriate word for “worship”.208 
 
It is legitimate to ask how, although it is claimed to be weak by the 
Republican elites, Arabic was able to interpenetrate Turkish to a high degree. 
Their answer would possibly be the policies of the Ottoman Empire. It would 
not be fair to deny such an argument but it does not enough to explain the 
existence of the Arabic words that pure Turkish could not replace. We can 
easily infer, therefore, that majority of the Republican elites’ theories against 
the Arabic language or those favoring the Turkish language are scientifically 
untenable.  
 
This chapter showed that the Ulus was the integral part of the purification 
process of the Turkish language. Republican elites used this process as a 
break up from the Eastern culture in favor of a Western identity. Arabic 
letters and the language itself were insulted for being the remnants of the 
Ottoman Empire, in which the Turkish identity did not mean anything 
important. As part of the nation building process, a language that completely 
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belonged to the new nation was needed. While creating the necessary 
language through purifying the old one, elites did not hesitate to place Turks 
superior positions against Arabs and Turkish against Arabic. Although the 
diplomatic relations with the Arab world remained peaceful and constructive 
for the most of the time, issues that are strictly related to culture and identity 
were an exception. Newly established Turkish Republic made sure its citizens 
to be a part of the Western world regarding their identity. Therefore, it is not 
possible to talk about a single policy against the Arab world.  
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4. STEREOTYPING ARABS: EXAMPLES FROM THE DAILY ULUS 
AND THE AKBABA 
 
 
 
 
This chapter will deal with the stereotyping process of the Arabs in Kemalist 
Turkey through examples from the Ulus and the Akbaba. I will try to analyze 
how functional were these stereotypes during the nation building and identity 
creating process in Turkey. I will also combine psychology literature on 
stereotypes with the historical analysis of such usages. I will show how Arabs 
were one of the defining “others” of the Turkish identity. 
 
 
 
 
4.1. Theorizing Stereotype 
 
 
Stereotypes have important impact on inter group relations. The concept has 
mostly been studied under Psychology and as a cognitive process. However, 
starting with 1960s, studies have also shown stereotyping as an outcome of 
sociocultural interactions.
209
 Stereotypes can be defined as “beliefs about 
characteristics, attributes and behaviors of members of certain groups”.210 
Allport also defines stereotypes as “an exaggerated belief associated with a 
category”. They are functional justifying or rationalizing our conduct 
associated with that category.
211
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There are several explanations for emergence of stereotypes. They may 
emerge first, in response to group conflict; second, to maintain and justify the 
status quo; finally they may emerge as a result of a need for a social 
identity.
212
 Another argument is that, an inter-group conflict is not necessary 
for a stereotype to emerge; a mere group identity is enough to form a 
stereotype towards the “others”. According to this view, stereotypes are used 
to create a social identity by “increasing the intergroup differentiation 
between in group and out group”.213 
 
Although stereotypes are usually treated as inaccurate judgments, they 
successfully survive for the long periods of time. They are considered 
inaccurate as they portray the given group as homogenous.
214
 How they then 
manage to survive if they are inaccurate? Despite their inaccurateness, they 
provide feeling of superiority or security.
215
 The superiority feeling is gained 
mostly with pejorative terms against the out-group. Believing in their 
supposed weakness or assumed inferior identity can cause damage to the 
stereotyped group. However, it is not only the group that is stereotyped is 
affected negatively from this process but also the ones who employ 
stereotypes. Stereotypes hinder social interactions between the two groups 
and create mental barriers, which are hard to overcome.
216
 
 
In the Turkish example of stereotypes against Arabs, they were functional in 
the midst of nation building. These stereotypes reproduced and reinforced by 
the elites through media in the popular culture to create an identity that is the 
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opposite of the Arab identity. Therefore, the Arabs were one of the others of 
the Turks with their assumed backwardness
217
, traditional structures and 
Islamic values. Stereotypes were effectively employed and exploited by the 
elites in this sense. Following sections are devoted to the examples of such 
stereotypes regarding Arabs and the way they were used to promote the 
Turkish identity.  
 
 
 
4.2. Examples From the Ulus 
 
 
In the Ulus, Arabs were mostly portrayed as backward, underdeveloped and 
when it comes to language reform, they are portrayed as “attackers”. Arabs 
were used as one of the “others” of the Turkish civilization and the 
modernization process started with the Republic. Arabs and their language 
were degraded as being backward when Turkish language needed to be 
empowered.  
 
There are plenty of examples that showed Arabs as backward. For instance, 
Mehmet Nermi, a columnist, wrote, “Eastern World has always tried to 
appease their need of “not to be seen useless” through arguments and sapient 
words coming from Arabic lands.”218 He calls this as “thinking laziness” and 
argues that this type of laziness is very active in the political world of East. 
He goes on and says; “we have nothing to do with the places that darkness 
has fall upon and that their snore has not been heard of anymore”.219 
 
Stereotypes are also used to prove assumed superiority of a group towards the 
other. We see several very telling examples of such attitude in the Ulus 
towards Arabs. In those examples, Turks are promoted as being the masters 
of Arab people. For instance, Mehmet Şeref Aykut, Edirne MP talks about 
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men who come to serve in military and points out their Arabic rooted names 
such as Ali, Hüseyin and Ahmet, which are very common in Turkish society, 
and argues that these are not the names of Turks but those of Arabs. 
According to him, the Turks, who were a race of bravery, were too tough for 
those “desert Arabs” that attacked and failed to beat. He writes, “The Turk 
has stopped his [the Arab] attacks and has never given up his existence by 
enduring all the villainy of the Arab until the Arab was passed under the yoke 
of the Turk and called him ‘sir’.”220 
 
According to him, Turks have chosen Islam when they became the master of 
Arabs. We understand that he sees Islam as the religion of Arabs, and he feels 
the need to explain how Turks have become Muslim, an alien religious 
identity. Arabs could not enslave the Turks; he argues, through sword or tax 
exemption –an Islamic policy for Muslim societies. When the Turks became 
the master and statesmen, however, then the Arab surrounded the Turk in his 
language, faith, religion and life and wanted to stop him.
221
 
 
Previous quote is also an obvious example of how the Republican elites 
perceived the Arabs as the ones that attacked Turks in the history and 
continue to attack now. As already noted, stereotypes tend to surface during 
the perception of threat or inter group conflict. This inter group conflict does 
not necessarily two sided as it is the case in our example. During the language 
purification process, a perception of threat from the Arabs peaked as the elites 
“realized” the significant impact of Arabic rooted words in Turkish. 
Republican elites in the Ulus tend to describe such reality as “Arabic attack”. 
However, such description was not enough; this assumed attack needed to be 
reified or concretized. Therefore, a picture of Arabs as attackers against Turks 
throughout the history was created and exploited by the elites. 
 
Another stereotype against Arabs and Arabic world in general is their 
undeveloped condition. I have already noted how the Arabic language was 
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perceived as the language of uncivilized; such view is not limited to 
language. Undeveloped and backward condition of Arabic world is not 
associated with more structural or institutional causes. It is possible to trace 
prejudiced and somewhat racist motive behind the notion of backwardness of 
Arabs. Falih Rıfkı’s observations in his work Zeytindağı, which was first 
published in the Ulus, exemplify such attitude. When he compares Arabic and 
Jewish neighborhoods in Palestine, he notes the squalidity and undeveloped 
conditions of streets and people of Arabic neighborhood and prosperity and 
order in Jewish neighborhoods.
222
 Reading these lines with the negative 
perception against Arabs that has been underlined throughout this study, one 
may conclude that such views toward Arabs might had been constructed well 
before such visit took place.  
 
Falih Rıfkı’s stereotypical views toward Arabs and Arabic lands are not 
limited to this small example. There are several others related to different 
prejudices against Arabs. For instance, aggressiveness of Arabs especially 
against Turks is noted in his writings. He talks about anti-Turk stance of 
Arabs and argues, “when one removes anti-Turk component from Arabic 
question in the Middle East, Syria and Saudi Arabia question would be 
tangled”.223 There are also plenty of stereotypes about Arabs’ personalities or 
characteristics. He implies Arabs’ tendency to lie224 and their over-interest in 
money.
225
  
 
Another example for stereotyping Arabs comes from Aka Gündüz. In his op-
ed titled as “Egypt Epidemic” he talks about a certain type of epidemic, 
which he believes that it is more horrifying and important than “Spanish Flu”, 
typhus or tuberculosis. He writes: 
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This sickness catches young girls, young widows and lonely 
stupid women. In there [Egypt], there is sterling, a pursy 
husband with eye booger, and a hefty Agha…What are you 
waiting for my lady? There he waits an Agha with a golden 
cord on his belly, with a knotted language and distorted voice. 
Why don’t you accept his proposal?226  
  
Aka Gündüz’s writings always provide abundant resources for stereotyping 
and nationalist, racist claims. This time he does not hesitate to urge Turkish 
women to not marry with rich Arabic landlords. He mocks with the assumed 
physical appearances of Arabs and believes that such tendency, marrying an 
Arab, is more horrifying than deadly organic endemics. His urgent call for to 
end such “social reality” can be seen as yet another example of stereotyping 
in the face of a perceived threat from the “other”. This time, the “other” is 
threatening pure Turkish identity through deceiving “stupid young women”. I 
make such comment because in the end he notes “Turkey’s women-girls, men 
or elderly belongs to this land”. He wants them to marry any man but with 
one condition, that is he must be a Turk. Stereotyping is functional, in this 
example, in building or creating an identity and maintaining its assumed 
pureness.  
 
Arabs were also historically considered to be the ones who unevenly 
exploited the resources of the lands of Turks. Meta narrative of Arabs 
backstabbing the Turks during the World War I is mostly accompanied by the 
argument that blames Arabs for being ungrateful, since they were a part of the 
Ottoman Empire and benefited from the resources that Ottoman Empire 
provided, as the argument goes. An example to such view can again be found 
in Falih Rıfkı’s words. He argues that the Ottoman Empire was a mere “field 
and street guard in the Arabic lands”. He then writes, “Ottoman Empire was a 
milch that laid down on its side from Thracia to Erzurum and surrendered its 
breasts into its colonies’ mouth, whose milk sucked, mixed with its blood.”227 
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This famous quote of Atay is striking in the sense that he clearly talks about 
colonies of the Ottoman Empires and he uses imperialist terms towards the 
Arabic lands. On the contrary of a general perception towards colonies, Atay 
argues that it was not the colonies per se that were exploited and whose 
resources were drained but the Ottoman Empire. He is basically not disturbed 
with an imperialist order if it functions “normally” and as long as the Turks 
benefit from it.  
 
Data from the Ulus shows us that inter-group conflict as a predictive variable 
for stereotyping is not supported enough. We see some traces of stereotyping 
during such times but it never goes on to a level that might affect the relations 
with Arabs. As already noted in the first chapter, Turkish foreign policy was 
pragmatic in nature, and it sought to not engage any unnecessary conflict with 
any country. As a result of such policy, inter-group conflicts such as Hatay 
Question or Fez Incident did not increase the level of stereotyping against 
Arabs.  
 
In our case, need for social identity and therefore Tajfel’s Social Identity 
Theory
228
, in which he argues that there is no need for conflict but social 
identity, does a better job in predicting increase in stereotyping. Almost all of 
the stereotypes against Arabs are related to Turkish identity. When the elites 
feel the need of stressing some feature of desired new Turkish identity, they 
tended to stereotype Arabs as an opposite of such identity. Arabs represent 
the culturally opposite ones, one of the “others” of the Turks and those whom 
Turks should differentiate themselves. In this sense, Pickering’s excellent 
account on how stereotype works is completely compatible with the Turkish 
case: 
Politics of representation here consisted of what the “Other” 
represented for us, for what it showed for “us”. What the 
“primitive” represented was “our” historically defined 
advancement over the ages. The primitive existed in a state of 
fundamental “un-development” and therefore in “societies 
without history” for history as progressive evolutionism 
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belonged to “us” and was about where “we” had come to at 
this pinnacle of social improvement and civilization.
229
 
 
Moises point out the fact that media affects our perception through such 
stereotypes, and they actually make people “believe” in these stereotypes 
rendering them as truth and influence their opinion.
230
 This is exactly what 
the Ulus does. The Ulus had been functional in building a new identity with 
its engaged publication policy with ruling elites. Through repetitive use of 
stereotypes against Arabs, the “other” of Turks, the Ulus could affect the 
opinion of masses, make them believe that the Arabs were undeveloped 
comparing to “our” glorious advancements, and with the leadership that they 
lacked, “we” were superior to Arabs, as “we” have always been in the history.  
 
Arabs as an aggressive attacker to Turks and as those who corrupted the pure 
Turkish identity including its language was needed to make people believe 
that such claims were actually true and such reforms on language, religion 
and in other spheres of social categories were necessary in order to 
differentiate “ourselves” from our uncivilized, undeveloped and corrupt 
“other”. As a modernized and westernized nation, any sign associated with 
Arabs was not acceptable. In such an environment, the Ulus played a key role 
for reproducing the stereotypes against Arabs. 
 
 
 
4.3. Examples From the Akbaba 
 
 
In this section we will look at examples of stereotyping against Arabs in a 
humor magazine titled the Akbaba. The Akbaba is a significant magazine in 
the history of Turkish literature. It was founded by Yusuf Ziya Ortaç in 1922 
and had been published until 1977, with some interruptions. Although it 
meant to be satirical, as the nature of political humor magazines, it had a mild 
tone regarding its criticisms and its publication policy mostly sided with the 
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government.
231
 Humor magazines are appropriate sources that would reflect 
the popular beliefs or perceptions. A review of such humor magazine would 
immensely contribute to understand dynamics of a given period, since it gives 
us more than formal information a newspaper would normally offer. I also 
need to emphasize that my inferences are only within the boundaries of what 
the Akbaba covered. Therefore a generalization may not be possible through a 
single case. However, it is still significant to give a fair idea of the popular 
view towards the Arabs. In the case of the Akbaba, due to its closure between 
the years of 1931-1933 and some missing volumes, I had to review the 
volumes between the years of 1933 and 1940.  
 
In the Akbaba, stereotypes are used to make fun of Arabs, as opposed to those 
of the Ulus’, in which the aim was to create a new Turkish identity by putting 
it just the opposite of assumed Arab identity. This attitude, however, is not 
surprising because of the nature of a humor magazine, it caricaturize. Usage 
of stereotypes is still important as this magazine widely circulated in public 
and it might have an affect on everyday language and perception of people. 
As such impact occurs, resistance of stereotypes to time becomes more likely. 
 
One of the most often used stereotypes about Arabs is related with their 
physical appearance. Their dark skin is almost every time emphasized and 
most of the time it is exaggerated. More importantly, such physical 
appearance is used to make fun of Arabs. There are plenty of examples of 
such usage. For instance, to argue that something is oxymoron, the author 
says it is as inappropriate as naming an Arab person “lily” or “snowball”, to 
imply Arabs and anything related to white could not go together.
232
 It would, 
of course, be legitimate to ask why would someone give “snowball” as a 
name, but questioning such irrationality is beyond the limits of this thesis.  
 
In another one, two boxers fight and one of them is fairly dark skinned and 
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that’s why called Arab. When the other suddenly falls down, one of the 
spectators objects to the situation and demands a new round. When he was 
asked why, he says because “he blacked [my emphasis] out”.233 Another 
caricature reads, “look, some Arabs have just moved to the house next to us”, 
and the other answers “they are not Arabs mom, they are our old neighbors, 
they have just returned from holiday”, pointing to their tanned skin (see 
figure 1.1 below).
234
 An interesting point about stereotype that renders Arabs 
as merely people with dark skins is that “Arab” and “black” was used 
interchangeably in the texts. We also witness one example in which a person 
first denoted as “negro” and then he was called “Arab”.235 Such confusion 
lasted until recently in the Turkish society, if not today. 
 
Another type of stereotype about Arabs is that their assumed keenness on 
money. One may argue that such belief among the people in Turkey still 
exists. In the Akbaba we observe several examples that Arabs were portrayed 
in a way that they overvalue money. For instance, in a story published in the 
Akbaba a Pasha notices an Arab in the room before he enters, thinks about the 
ways he could get rid off him. As he enters the room “the Arab rushes with 
the agility of a lap dog to reverence”. After a short questioning by the Pasha, 
Pasha gives him a gold to keep it as a pocket money. Arab quickly takes the 
gold, kisses it and puts on his head, bows again and rushes out of the room. 
Pasha and his guests laugh at what they have just seen.
236
 In another example, 
an Egyptian Arab is portrayed as greedy, money-minded and crook.
237
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Figure 1.1: An illustration from the Akbaba, stereotyping Arabs according to 
their skin color 
 
 
 
Arabs were also portrayed as being too lecherous. In the Akbaba Arabs with 
such personality were frequently used. For instance, a brief given about a 
  66 
marriage between a British high-class woman and an Arabic Sheikh with a 
comment saying “as cunning British politics knows how to handle a bee from 
its wings, a snake from its tail, it also know from where to handle a lustful 
Arab”.238 With its erotic message, the Akbaba implies Arabs’ “weakness” 
when it comes to sexuality. In another one, regarding the Hatay Question, a 
caricature on the front page portrayed Syria as an Arab man, who by force 
holds a girl – representing Hatay- and drools on her as he calls her “darling” 
(see figure 1.2).
239
 
 
Occasionally, it is possible to find harmony between the Ulus and the 
Akbaba. In the latter, stereotypes were not only used to make fun of Arabs but 
also to help manipulate the public opinion about ongoing political issues, 
especially the language reform and Arabic music. While Orhan Seyfi describe 
Arabic words in Turkish words as “blood sucker”240, another tries to prove 
people who insist on using Arabic words will eventually be left alone.
241
 
 
In another one, when Orhan Seyfi comments on the theory that some words 
that had previously been thought Arabic were actually Turkish, he says that 
the phrase “it is Arabic, is it not? Fabricate as you wish”242 proved to be true. 
According to him, Arabs were fabricating words from Turkish.
243
 
 
After the ban on traditional Turkish music on radios in 1934
244
 Arabic music 
became much more popular than ever because of its close melody to 
traditional Turkish music. Cairo radio gained popularity among the Turkish 
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Figure 1.2: Cover page of the Akbaba, illustrating Syria as a lecherous 
Arabic man 
 
 
people as a result of this policy. There was an active debate about the ban in 
the newspapers and magazines at the time most of them being supportive of 
  68 
the policy.
245
 The Akbaba did not hesitate to join the debates with a firm 
support for the ban. For instance Yusuf Ziya argued that there was no chance 
to excite the Turkish nation who are on the paved roads, “with a desert music, 
which is for dancers in Arab palaces with marble pools, to make them shake 
their bellies”. While these words are important in the sense that they prove 
the Akbaba’s usage of stereotypes in different contexts, they are also 
important to reveal how they borrow oriental terms from the West to describe 
Arabs and their way of life; such as “belly dancers” and “palaces with marble 
pools”. As already noted in the previous section, Arabs meant to be the 
undeveloped “other” of the civilized Turks. One may notice such attitude 
when the author places Turks and Arabs on the opposing sides by merely 
labeling Arabs living in deserts and Turks having “paved roads” instead. 
 
In general, we observe that being an Arab had utterly negative connotations. 
As we have already seen, Arabs were portrayed as lecherous and greedy. 
Being an Arab sometimes meant being incredibly ugly
246
, and other times it 
meant being a complete liar.
247
 Throughout my research on the Akbaba, I 
have never observed any single positive adjective to describe or define Arabs 
or any incidence that an Arab was portrayed in positive terms or not ridiculed. 
One may still observe the same stereotypes against Arabs in the popular 
culture. What we see, therefore, is that the Akbaba chose to use, exploit and 
reproduce such stereotypes and it contributed to maintain such perceptions 
against Arabs in the society level. The Akbaba’s stance towards Arabs was 
shaped in some cases by the ongoing debates in the political arena.  In this 
sense, the Akbaba was functional to help the state to construct a new identity 
for Turks by most of the time placing it just the opposite of Arabs; “people of 
the East”.  
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
Turkish – Arab relations has not received the attention it deserved by the 
academia. There is a significant dearth in literature regarding nuanced 
historical analysis of the relations between the two taking both sides’ 
narratives into account. On the Turkish side, one explanation for such 
negligence can be the common belief that Turkey and Arab world did not 
have active relations starting with the establishment of the new Republic in 
Turkey. This thesis aims to oppose this view by offering a new look to the 
past relations.  
 
The main findings of this research can be categorized under three aspects. 
First, from what we witness in the Ulus, in a foreign policy perspective 
Turkey and the Arab world had active relations compared to the traditional 
view that argues such relations either did not exist or remained in a minimal 
level. The first chapter that is devoted to the nuanced historical narrative and 
analysis of the relations between Turkey and selected Arabic states showed 
that close relations were maintained. Considering Turkey’s inward looking 
world view at the time due to several internal problems as a result of being a 
newly founded state, Turkey’s relations with the Arab world is significant. 
Turkey did not show any sign of ceasing relations with any Arabic country. 
On the contrary, in tandem with the Turkish foreign policy understanding at 
the time, Turkey wanted to maintain relations in a peaceful manner, even 
during diplomatic crises.  Moreover, Turkey also supported well being of its 
neighbors, admitted state officials from several Arabic countries for 
diplomatic purposes, sent and received governmental and non-governmental 
representatives for the sake of better relations.  
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Second, good relations in the diplomatic level did not translate into positive 
perceptions in the identity level. One of the main purposes of the newly 
founded regime and its Kemalist ideology was to build a new nation and 
construct a new identity for the citizens. The new identity had nothing to do 
with the East in the eyes of the founding elites. Turkish identity was 
associated with being modernized and civilized and West oriented. With this 
motivation in mind, several reforms were carried out including script change 
and ban on fez and traditional Turkish music. In the identity level, an Arab 
meant just the opposite of the Turk.  
 
What I call “new” does not necessarily mean that it has not been articulated 
before. In the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century, a new identity for the 
constituents of the Empire had been discussed by the Ottoman elites. 
However, their efforts did not materialize and they could not be successful 
spreading it. Kemalist cadres have borrowed from the past efforts and steadily 
implemented it with the state policy. As it was the Kemalist Turkey that for 
the first time systematically pursued these policies and to some extend 
successfully created modern and Western identity, I call it “new”. Having 
said this, I therefore acknowledge the continuity from the Ottoman Empire.  
 
Lastly, the Ulus and the Republican elites tried to exploit social and political 
environment of the Arabic countries whenever possible. If there was anything 
to be praised about Arab countries, the Ulus tried to relate it with Turkey’s 
success under Ataturk and portrayed Arabic countries as those who imitate 
Turkey. If they encounter with a negative political or social phenomenon, 
then they use it to show Turkey’s successful reforms under the new Republic 
through Arabic countries both parts being the remnants of the Ottoman 
Empire. They tried to legitimize Kemalist reforms in every occasion in the 
eyes of the public through exploitation of the problems or successes of the 
Arabic countries. 
 
When we combine the first two findings we come to a conclusion that 
Turkey’s relations with the Arab world both physically and mentally was far 
from being simple, on the contrary it was highly complex and complicated in 
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nature. Turkish state had a really tough task to achieve; since the 
aforementioned two attitudes were fundamentally contradictory, Turkish 
elites needed to be really careful to maintain this complicated relations and 
make sure that such hostile feelings in the mental or identity level would have 
a minimum impact on the diplomatic level. Keeping such contradictory and 
shaky base in mind, diplomatic relations between the two can be regarded 
successful. This success, however, does not necessarily mean that it was 
sufficient enough. More nuanced relations could not be established, and I 
doubt that if it was even wanted. What this thesis argues, however, the 
relations were much better and active than thought and Turkey certainly did 
care about it.  
 
Even in the limits of a master’s thesis, assumed inactive relations between 
Turkey and the Arab world proved to be deficient, if not wrong. Studying 
through a newspaper of that period gives a fair idea of the atmosphere of that 
particular time and the reader easily make sense of the any situation that was 
tackled in any given moment. Moreover, studying the Ulus gives even more 
insight about the ideas of the Republican elite since the newspaper is known 
with its Republican stance and being the semi-official mouthpiece of CHP. 
Therefore this thesis assumes that published material gives a legitimate 
account of the views of Republican elites. The opposite could not be the case, 
since the media at the time was under strict control of the government. In 
order not to overstate my claims, I once again would like to emphasize that 
my findings are solely based upon what the Ulus, therefore the Republican 
elites perceived the relations. 
 
This thesis aims to contribute to the scholarly research on Turkish-Arabic 
relations both in the state and society level. Further research, however, is 
needed for more detailed account of the relations between the two, as this 
thesis do not address the “other” side. Further research could look at the 
relations from the Arabic side, including perceptions toward Turkey and 
Turkish society in general. In addition to that, other newspapers and some 
primary sources including the autobiography, diary or any other book written 
by a member of the Republican elite could be studied and historically 
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analyzed for a better coverage of the period. In addition to these, it is strange 
that the only independent countries of the time, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, did 
not receive significant attention from the Ulus. We do not know enough about 
the relations with these countries. In order to answer the legitimate question 
that asks whether the interest of the Ulus for colonized Arabic countries 
derived from Turkey’s interest of having good relations with the Western 
countries, further research on the relations with the independent Arabic 
countries is needed. 
 
Beyond its historical importance, this thesis is important within the 
contemporary context in which the relations between the Arab world and 
Turkey are in a transition period. Especially after the Arab Spring, several 
scholars and experts of region have suggested Turkey as a role model.
248
 As 
of November 2013, however, Turkey is facing some difficulties adapting its 
foreign policy to the changing dynamics of the region, and as a result several 
people is concerned about Turkey’s increasing isolation from the region. 
Turkey is now in a severe diplomatic crisis with Egypt, as the latter declared 
Turkish ambassador persona non grata. Turkey has also cut off relations with 
Syria for more than two years now. In the time of a deep uncertainty, we need 
to know more about the history and more about the feelings of peoples 
towards each other. I hope the current interest in the region would translate 
into more active and comprehensive historical research. 
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